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Abstract
Player-Compatible Equilibrium (PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on
the magnitudes of the players’ “trembles” onto different strategies. These re-
strictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments
by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects
intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equi-
librium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite.
We show that rational learning and some near-optimal heuristics imply our
compatibility restrictions in a steady-state setting.
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1 Introduction
Starting with Selten (1975), a number of papers have used the device of vanishingly
small “trembles” to refine the set of Nash equilibria. This paper introduces player-
compatible equilibrium (PCE), which extends this approach by imposing cross-player
restrictions on these trembles in a way that is invariant to the utility representations of
players’ preferences over game outcomes. The heart of this refinement is the concept
of player compatibility, which says player i is more compatible with strategy s∗i than
player j is with strategy s∗j if whenever s∗j is optimal for j against some correlated
profile σ, s∗i is optimal for i against any profile σˆ matching σ in terms of the play
of the third parties, −ij. PCE requires that cross-player tremble magnitudes respect
compatibility rankings. As we will explain, PCE interprets “trembles” as deliberate
experiments to learn how others play, not as mistakes, and derives its cross-player
tremble restrictions from an analysis of the relative frequencies of experiments that
different players choose to undertake.
Section 2 defines PCE, studies their basic properties, and proves that PCE exist
in all finite games. The compatibility relation is easiest to satisfy when i and j are
“non-interacting,” meaning that their payoffs do not depend on each other’s play. But
PCE can have bite even when all players interact with each other, provided that the
interactions are not too strong. Moreover, as shown by the examples in Section 3, PCE
can rule out seemingly implausible equilibria that other tremble-based refinements
such as trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium
(Myerson, 1978) cannot eliminate.
One of these examples is a “link-formation game,” where players on each side
decide whether or not to pay a cost to be Active and form links with all of the active
players on the other side. In the “anti-monotonic” version of the game, players who
incur a higher private cost of link formation give lower benefits to their linked part-
ners; in the “co-monotonic” version, higher cost players give others higher benefits.
We show that the only PCE outcome in the anti-monotonic version is for all players
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to choose Active, while in the co-monotonic case both “all Active” and “all Inac-
tive” are PCE outcomes. In contrast, the equilibria that satisfy other equilibrium
refinements do not depend on whether payoffs are anti-monotonic or co-monotonic.
PCE is defined for general strategic form games, and stands on its own as a useful
refinement of trembling-hand perfection. Moreover, PCE’s compatibility restrictions
on trembles are implied by models of learning in a class of extensive form games we
describe below. In our learning framework, agents are born into different player roles
of a stage game, and believe that they face an unknown, time-invariant distribution
of opponents’ play, as they would in a steady state of a model where a continuum of
anonymous agents are randomly matched each period. Each agent only learns about
others’ play through her own payoffs at the end of the game. Because agents expect
to play the game many times, they may choose to “experiment” and use myopically
sub-optimal strategies for their informational value. The compatibility restriction on
trembles then arises from the differences in the attractiveness of various experiments
for different players. For example, in the link-formation game, an agent choosing
Inactive always receives the same payoff and same information regardless of others’
play, so they may try playing Active even if their prior belief is that the low-benefits
counterparty is more likely to play Active than the high-benefits one. As is intuitive,
we show that a low-cost agent has a stronger incentive to experiment with Active
than a high-cost one does, and will do so more frequently against any mixed play of
the counterparties.
The analysis of learning requires details about the extensive form that are not
represented by the strategic form, and we are not able to capture its implications
in general extensive forms. To make the analysis more tractable, Section 5 restricts
attention to a class of “factorable” games, where repeatedly playing a given strategy
si would reveal all of the payoff consequences of that strategy and no information
about the payoff consequences of any other strategy s′i 6= si. This restriction implies
that at any strategy profile s, if player i potentially cares about the action taken at
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some information set h of −i, then either h is on the path of s or i can put h onto the
path of play via a unilateral deviation. Thus there is no possibility of learning being
“blocked” by other players, and no “free riding” by learning from others’ experiments.
For simplicity we also require that each player moves at most once along any path of
play. The three examples in 3 all satisfy these restrictions for generic extensive-form
payoffs.
In factorable games, each agents faces a combinatorial bandit problem (see Section
5.2). We consider two related models of how agents deal with the trade-off between
exploration and exploitation — the classic model of rational Bayesians maximizing
discounted expected utility under the belief that the environment (the aggregate
strategy distribution in the population) is constant, and the computationally sim-
pler method of Bayesian upper-confidence bounds1 (Kaufmann, Cappé, and Garivier,
2012). In both of these models, the agent uses an “index policy,” meaning that they
assign a numerical index to each strategy that depends only on past observations
when that strategy was used, and then chooses the strategy with the highest index.
We formulate a compatibility condition for index policies, and show that any index
policies for i and j satisfying this compatibility condition for strategies s∗i and s∗j
will lead to i experimenting relatively more with s∗i than j with s∗j . To complete the
micro-foundation of PCE, we then show that the Bayes optimal policy and the Bayes-
UCB heuristic satisfy the compatibility condition for strategies s∗i and s∗j whenever i
is more compatible s∗i than player j is with strategy s∗j and the agents in roles i and
j face comparable learning problems (e.g. start with the same patience level, same
prior beliefs about the play of third parties, etc).
1Briefly, upper confidence bound algorithms originated as computationally tractable algorithms
for multi-armed bandit problems (Agrawal, 1995; Katehakis and Robbins, 1995). We consider a
Bayesian version of the algorithm that keeps track of the learner’s posterior beliefs about the payoffs
of different strategies, first analyzed by Kaufmann, Cappé, and Garivier (2012). We say more about
this procedure in Section 5. See Francetich and Kreps (2018) for a discussion of other heuristics for
active learning.
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1.1 Related Work
1.1.1 Tremble-Based Refinements
Tremble-based solution concepts date back to Selten (1975), who thanks Harsanyi
for suggesting them. These solution concepts consider totally mixed strategy profiles
where players do not play an exact best reply to the strategies of others, but may
assign positive probability to some or all strategies that are not best replies. Different
solution concepts in this class consider different kinds of “trembles,” but they all
make predictions based on the limits of these non-equilibrium strategy profiles as the
probability of trembling tends to zero. Since we compare PCE to these refinements
below, we summarize them here for the reader’s convenience.
An -perfect equilibrium is a totally mixed strategy profile where every non-best
reply has weight less than . A limit of t-perfect equilibria where t → 0 is called a
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. An -proper equilibrium is a totally mixed strategy
profile σ where for every player i and strategies si and s
′
i, if Ui(si, σ−i) < Ui(s
′
i, σ−i)
then σi(si) <  · σi(s′i). A limit of t-proper equilibria where t → 0 is called a proper
equilibrium; in this limit a more costly tremble is infinitely less likely than a less
costly one, regardless of the cost difference. Approachable equilibrium (Van Damme,
1987) is also based on the idea that strategies with worse payoffs are played less often.
It too is the limit of t-perfect equilibria, but where the players pay control costs to
reduce their tremble probabilities. When these costs are “regular,” all of the trembles
are of the same order. Because PCE does not require that the less likely trembles
are infinitely less likely than more likely ones, it is closer to approachable equilibrium
than to proper equilibrium. The strategic stability concept of Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986) is also defined using trembles, but applies to components of Nash equilibria as
opposed to single strategy profiles.
Unlike the central feature of PCE, proper equilibrium and approachable equilib-
rium do not impose cross-player restrictions on the relative probabilities of various
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trembles. For this reason, when each type of the sender is viewed as a different player
these equilibrium concepts reduce to perfect Bayesian equilibrium in signaling games
with two possible signals, such as the beer-quiche game of Cho and Kreps (1987).
They do impose restrictions when applied to the ex-ante form of the game, i.e. at the
stage before the sender has learned their type. However, as Cho and Kreps (1987)
point out, evaluating the cost of mistakes at the ex-ante stage means that the interim
losses are weighted by the prior distribution over sender types, so that less likely
types are more likely to tremble. In addition, applying a different positive linear
rescaling to each type’s utility function preserves every type’s preference over lotter-
ies on outcomes, but changes the sets of proper and approachable equilibria, while
such utility rescalings have no effect on the set of PCE. In light of these issues, when
discussing tremble-based refinements in Bayesian games we will always apply them
at the interim stage.
Like PCE, extended proper equilibrium (Milgrom and Mollner, 2017) places re-
strictions on the relative probabilities of tremble by different players, but it does
so in a different way: An extended proper equilibrium is the limit of (β,t)−proper
equilibria, where β = (β1, ...βI) is a strictly positive vector of utility re-scaling, and
σi(si) < t · σj(sj) if player i’s rescaled loss from si (compared to the best response)
is less than j’s loss from sj. In a signaling game with only two possible signals, ev-
ery Nash equilibrium where each sender type strictly prefers not to deviate from her
equilibrium signal is an extended proper equilibrium at the interim stage, because
suitable utility rescalings for the types can lead to any ranking of their utility costs
of deviating to the off-path signal. By contrast, Proposition 4 shows every PCE must
satisfy the compatibility criterion of Fudenberg and He (2018), which has bite even
in binary signaling games such as the beer-quiche example of Cho and Kreps (1987).
So an extended proper equilibrium need not be a PCE, a fact that Examples 1 and
2 further demonstrate. Conversely, because extended proper equilibrium makes some
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trembles infinitely less likely than others, it can eliminate some PCE.2
1.1.2 The Learning Foundations of Equilibrium
This paper builds on the work of Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Fudenberg and
Kreps (1995, 1994) on learning foundations for self-confirming and Nash equilibrium.
It is also related to recent work that that provides explicit learning foundations for
various equilibrium concepts that reflect ambiguity aversion, misspecified priors, or
model uncertainty, such as Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci
(2016), Battigalli, Francetich, Lanzani, and Marinacci (2017), Esponda and Pouzo
(2016), and Lehrer (2012). Unlike those papers, we focus on the very patient agents
who undertake many “experiments,” and characterize the relative rates of experi-
mentation under rational expected-utility maximization and related “near-optimal”
heuristics. For this reason our analysis of learning is closer to Fudenberg and Levine
(2006) and Fudenberg and He (2018).
Our investigation of learning dynamics significantly expands on that of Fudenberg
and He (2018), which focused on a particular learning rule (rational Bayesians) in
a restricted set of games (signaling games). In contrast, our analysis applies to a
broader class of learning rules — specifically, index policies that satisfy a related
compatibility condition, and to a larger family of games, the factorable games defined
in Section 4. We develop new tools to deal with new issues that arise in this more
general setting. For instance, Fudenberg and He (2018) compare the Gittins indices of
different sender types using the fact that any stopping time (for the auxiliary optimal-
stopping problem defining the index) of the less-compatible type is also feasible for
the more-compatible type. But our general setting allows player roles to interact, so it
is not valid to exchange the stopping times of different players as they may condition
on observed play in different parts of the game tree. We deal with this problem by
considering how i can nevertheless construct a feasible stopping time that mimics an
2Example available on request.
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unfeasible one of j. Moreover, when a player faces more than one opponent, their
optimal experimentation policy may lead them to observe a correlated distribution of
opponents’ play, even though the opponents do no actually play correlated strategies.
We discuss this issue of endogenous correlation in Section 5.4.2; it is the reason we
define PCE in terms of correlated play.
In methodology the paper is related to other work on active learning and experi-
mentation. In single-agent settings, these include Doval (2018), Francetich and Kreps
(2018), and Fryer and Harms (2017). In multi-agent settings additional issues arise
such as free-riding and encouraging others to learn, see e.g. Bolton and Harris (1999),
Keller et al. (2005), Klein and Rady (2011), Heidhues, Rady, and Strack (2015), Frick
and Ishii (2015), Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2016), Strulovici (2010), and the survey by
Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016). Unlike most models of multi-agent bandit problems,
our agents only learn from personal histories, not from the actions or histories of oth-
ers. Our focus is the comparison of experimentation policies under different payoff
parameters, which is central to PCE’s cross-player tremble restrictions.
2 Player-Compatible Equilibrium
2.1 Compatibility
In this section, we first define the player-compatibility relation and discuss its basic
properties. We then introduce PCE, which embodies cross-player tremble restrictions
based on this relation.
Consider a strategic-form game with a finite set of players i ∈ I, finite strategy
sets |Si| ≥ 2,3 and utility functions Ui : S → R, where S := ×iSi. We assume no
player has a strictly dominated strategy, which lets us avoid some complications that
would otherwise need to be treated separately. This assumption is consistent with the
3If Si = {s∗i } is a singleton, we would have (s∗i | i) % (sj | j) and (sj | j) % (s∗i | i) for any
strategy sj of any player j if we follow the convention that the maximum over an empty set is −∞.
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learning foundation we provide for PCE, because that foundation considers settings
where playing one strategy si gives no information about the payoff consequences of
any other strategy s′i 6= si. Thus strictly dominated strategies will never be played,
even as experiments, so they may be deleted from the game.
For each i, let ∆(Si) denote the set of mixed strategies for i. For K ⊆ I, set
SK=×i∈KSi and let ∆(SK) represent the set of correlated strategies among players K.
Let ∆◦(SK) represent the interior of ∆(SK), that is the set of full-support correlated
strategies on SK .4
We formalize the concept of “compatibility” between players and their strategies
in this general setting, which will play a central role in the definition of PCE in
determining cross-player restrictions on trembles.
Definition. For player i 6= j and strategies s∗i ∈ Si, s∗j ∈ Sj, say i is more compatible
with s∗i than j is with s∗j , abbreviated as s∗i % s∗j ,5 if for every totally mixed correlated
strategy profiles σ ∈ ∆◦(S) with
∑
s∈S
Uj(s∗j , s−j) · σ(s) = max
s
′
j∈Sj
∑
s∈S
Uj(s
′
j, s−j) · σ(s),
we get ∑
s∈S
Ui(s∗i , s−i) · σ˜(s) > max
s
′′
i ∈Si\{s∗i }
∑
s∈S
Ui(s
′′
i , s−i) · σ˜(s)
for every totally mixed correlated strategy profile σ˜ ∈ ∆◦(S) satisfying marg−ij(σ) =
marg−ij(σ˜).
In words, if s∗j is weakly optimal for the less-compatible j against σ, then s∗i is
strictly optimal for the more-compatible i against any σ˜ whose marginal on −ij’s play
is totally mixed and agrees with that of σ. As this restatement makes clear, the com-
patibility condition only depends on players’ preferences over probability distribution
4Recall that a full-support correlated strategy assigns positive probability to every pure strategy
profile.
5This notation is unambiguous provided i and j have disjoint strategy sets. In the event that i
and j share some strategies, we will clarify this notation by attaching player subscripts.
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on S, and not on the particular utility representations chosen.
Since ×i∆◦(Si) ⊆ ∆◦(S), our definition of compatibility ranks fewer strategy-
player pairs than an alternative definition that only considers mixed strategy profiles
with independent mixing between different opponents. 6 We use the more strin-
gent definition to match the microfoundations of our compatibility-based cross-player
restrictions.
The compatibility relation is transitive, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 1. Suppose s∗i % s∗j % s∗k where s∗i , s∗j , s∗k are strategies of i, j, k. Then
s∗i % s∗k.
The next result states that the compatibility relation is asymmetric, except in the
corner case where both strategies are weakly dominated.
Proposition 2. If s∗i % s∗j , then either s∗j 6% s∗i , or both s∗j and s∗i are weakly domi-
nated strategies.
The proof of Propositions 1 and 2 are straightforward; they can be found in the
Online Appendix.
We think of PCE as primarily a solution concept for games with three or more
players, where the relative tremble probabilities of i 6= j affect some third party’s
best response.
If players i and j care a great deal about each other’s strategies, then their best
responses are unlikely to be determined only by the play of the third parties. In the
other extreme, a game has a multipartite structure if the set of players I can be divided
into C mutually exclusive classes, I = I1 ∪ ...∪ IC , in such a way that whenever i and
j belong to the same class i, j ∈ Ic, (1) they are non-interacting, meaning i’s payoff
does not depend on the strategy of j and j’s payoff does not depend on the strategy
of i; (2) they have the same strategy set, Si = Sj. As a leading case, every Bayesian
6Formally, this alternative definition would replace “totally mixed correlated strategy profiles”
with “independently and totally mixed strategy profiles” in the Definition of s∗i % s∗j .
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game has the multipartite structure when each type is viewed as a different player.
In addition, the “link-formation game” in Example 2 is a complete-information game
with the multipartite structure. In a game with multipartite structure with i, j ∈ Ic,
we may write Ui(sc, s−ij) without ambiguity for sc ∈ Si, since all augmentations of
the strategy profile s−ij with a strategy by player j lead to the same payoff for i. For
s∗c ∈ Si = Sj, the definition of s∗ic % s∗jc reduces7 to: For every totally mixed correlated
σ with σ−ij ∈ ∆◦(S−ij),
∑
s∈S
Uj(s∗jc, s−ij) · σ(s) = max
s
′
j∈Sj
∑
s∈S
Uj(s
′
j, s−ij) · σ(s)
implies ∑
s∈S
Ui(s∗ic, s−ij) · σ˜(s) > max
s
′′
i ∈Si\{s∗ic}
∑
s∈S
Ui(s
′′
i , s−ij) · σ˜(s).
While the player-compatibility condition is especially easy to state for non-interacting
players, our learning foundation will also justify cross-player tremble restrictions for
pairs of players i, j whose payoffs do depend on each others’ strategies, as in the
“restaurant game” we discuss in Example 1.
2.2 Player-Compatible Trembles and PCE
We now move towards the definition of PCE. PCE is a tremble-based solution con-
cept. It builds on and modifies Selten (1975)’s definition of trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium as the limit of equilibria of perturbed games in which agents are con-
strained to tremble, so we begin by defining our notation for the trembles and the
associated constrained equilibria.
Definition. A tremble profile  assigns a positive number (si | i) > 0 to every player
i and pure strategy si. Given a tremble profile , write Πi for the set of -strategies
7We use s∗ic to refer to i’s copy of s∗c and s∗jc to refer to j’s copy.
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of player i, namely:
Πi := {σi ∈ ∆(Si) s.t. σi(si) ≥ (si | i) ∀si ∈ Si} .
We call σ◦ an -equilibrium if for each i,
σ◦i ∈ arg max
σi∈Πi
Ui(σi, σ◦−i).
Note that Πi is compact and convex. It is also non-empty when  is close enough
to 0. By standard results, whenever  is small enough so that Πi is non-empty for
each i, an -equilibrium exists.
The key building block for PCE is -PCE, which is an -equilibrium where the
tremble profile is “co-monotonic” with % in the following sense:
Definition. Tremble profile  is player compatible if (s∗i | i) ≥ (s∗j | j) for all
i, j, s∗i , s
∗
j such that s∗i % s∗j . An -equilibrium where  is player compatible is called
a player-compatible -equilibrium (or -PCE).
The condition on  says the minimum weight i could assign to s∗i is no smaller
than the minimum weight j could assign to s∗j in the constrained game,
min
σi∈Πi
σi(s∗i ) ≥ min
σj∈Πj
σj(s∗j).
This is a “cross-player tremble restriction,” that is, a restriction on the relative prob-
abilities of trembles by different players. Note that it, like the compatibility relation,
depends on the players’ preferences over distributions on S but not on the particular
utility representation used. This invariance property distinguishes player-compatible
trembles from other models of stochastic behavior such as the stochastic terms in
logit best responses.
As is usual for tremble-based equilibrium refinements, we now define PCE as the
limit of a sequence of -PCE where → 0.
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Definition. A strategy profile σ∗ is a player-compatible equilibrium (PCE) if there
exists a sequence of player-compatible tremble profiles (t) → 0 and an associated
sequence of strategy profiles σ(t), where each σ(t) is an (t)-PCE, such that σ(t) → σ∗.
The cross-player restrictions embodied in player-compatible trembles translate
into analogous restrictions on PCE, as shown in the next result.
Proposition 3. For any PCE σ∗, player k, and strategy s¯k such that σ∗k(s¯k) > 0,
there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy profiles σ(t)−k → σ∗−k such that
(i) for every pair i, j 6= k with s∗i % s∗j ,
lim inf
t→∞
σ
(t)
i (s∗i )
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
≥ 1;
and (ii) s¯k is a best response for k against every σ(t)−k .
The proof of this and subsequent results in the main text appear in the Appendix.
That is, treating each σ(t)−k as a totally mixed approximation to σ∗−k, in a PCE
each player k essentially best responds to totally mixed opponent play that respects
player compatibility.
It is easy to show that every -PCE respects player compatibility up to the “adding
up constraint” that probabilities on different strategies must sum up to 1 and i must
place probability no smaller than (s′i | i) on strategies s′i 6= s∗i . The “up to” qualifi-
cation disappears in the (t) → 0 limit because the required probabilities on s′i 6= s∗i
tend to 0.
Since PCE is defined as the limit of -equilibria for a restricted class of trembles,
PCE form a subset of trembling-hand perfect equilibria; the next result shows this
subset is not empty. It uses the fact that the tremble profiles with the same lower
bound on the probability of each action satisfy the compatibility condition in any
game.
Theorem 1. PCE exists in every finite strategic-form game.
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2.3 Some Properties of PCE
A tremble profile  is uniform if for all i and si ∈ Si, we have (si | i) =  for the
same  > 0. A trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is a uniform THPE if it is the
limit of -equilibria where → 0 and each tremble profile  is uniform. The proof of
Theorem 1 in fact establishes the existence of uniform THPE, which form a subset
of PCE since uniform trembles are always player compatible regardless of the stage
game.
One drawback of uniform THPE is that there is no clear microfoundation for
uniform trembles. In addition to the cross-player restrictions of the compatibility
condition, these uniform trembles impose the same lower bound on the tremble prob-
abilities for all strategies of each given player. PCE and the learning foundation
we develop allow for more complicated patterns of experimentation that respect the
compatibility structure. We study a more permissive refinement than uniform THPE
where we can offer a learning story for the tremble restrictions. PCE is a fairly weak
solution concept that nevertheless has bite in some cases of interest, as we will discuss
in Sections 3.
3 Examples of PCE
In this section, we study examples of games where PCE rules out unintuitive Nash
equilibria. We will also use these examples to distinguish PCE from existing refine-
ments.
3.1 The Restaurant Game
We start with a complete-information game where PCE differs from other solution
concepts.
Example 1. There are three players in the game: a food critic, a regular diner, and
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a restaurant. Simultaneously, the restaurant decides between ordering high-quality
(H) or low-quality (L) ingredients, while critic and the diner decide whether to go
eat at the restaurant (R) or order pizza (Z) and eat at home. The utility from Z
is normalized to 0. If both customers choose Z, the restaurant also gets 0 payoff.
Otherwise, the restaurant’s payoff depends on the ingredient quality and clientele.
Choosing L yields a profit of +2 per customer while choosing H yields a profit of +1
per customer. In addition, if the food critic is present, she will write a review based
on ingredient quality, which affects the restaurant’s payoff by ±2.5. Each customer
gets a payoff of x < −1 from consuming food made with low-quality ingredients and a
payoff of y > 0.5 from consuming food made with high-quality ingredients, while the
critic gets an additional +1 payoff from going to the restaurant and writing a review
(regardless of food quality). Customers each incur a 0.5 congestion cost if they both
go to the restaurant. This situation is depicted in the game tree below.
The strategies of the two customers affect each others’ payoffs, so the critic and
the diner are not non-interacting players. In particular, the they cannot be mapped
into two types of the same agent in a Bayesian game.
The strategy profile (Zc, Zd, L) is a proper equilibrium, sustained by the restau-
rant’s belief that when at least one customer plays R, it is far more likely that the
diner deviated to patronizing the restaurant than the critic, even though the critic
has a greater incentive to go to the restaurant as she gets paid for writing reviews. It
14
is also an extended proper equilibrium.8
We claim that Rc % Rd. To see this, note that for any profile σ of totally mixed,
correlated play that makes the diner indifferent between Zd and Rd, we must have
U1(Rc, σ˜−c) ≥ 0.5 for any profile σ˜ that agrees with σ in terms of the restaurant’s
play. This is because the critic’s utility from Rc is minimized when the diner chooses
Rd with probability 1, but even then the critic gets 0.5 higher utility from going to
a crowded restaurant than the diner gets from going to an empty restaurant, holding
fixed food quality at the restaurant. This shows Rc % Rd.
Whenever σ(t)c (Rc)/σ
(t)
d (Rd) > 14 , the restaurant strictly prefersH over L. Thus by
Proposition 3, there is no PCE where the restaurant plays L with positive probability.

3.2 The Link-Formation Game
In the next example, PCE makes different predictions in two versions of a game with
different payoff parameters, while all other solution concepts we know of make the
same predictions in both versions.
Example 2. There are 4 players in the game, split into two sides: North and South.
The players are named North-1, North-2, South-1, and South-2, abbreviated as N1,
N2, S1, and S2 respectively.
These players engage in a strategic link-formation game. Each player simultane-
ously takes an action: either Inactive or Active. An Inactive player forms no links.
An Active player forms a link with every Active player on the opposite side. (Two
players on the same side cannot form links.) For example, suppose N1 plays Active,
N2 plays Active, S1 plays Inactive, and S2 plays Active. Then N1 creates a link
to S2, N2 creates a link to S2, S1 creates no links, and S2 creates links to both N1
and N2.
8(Zc, Zd, L) is an extended proper equilibrium, because scaling the critic’s payoff by a large
positive constant makes it more costly for the critic to deviate to R1 than for the diner to deviate
to R2.
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Each player i is characterized by two parameters: cost (ci) and quality (qi). Cost
refers to the private cost that a player pays for each link she creates. Quality refers
to the benefit that a player provides to others when they link to her. A player who
forms no links gets a payoff of 0. In the above example, the payoff to North-1 is
qS2 − cN1 and the payoff to South-2 is (qN1 − cS2) + (qN2 − cS2). 
We consider two versions of this game, shown below. In the anti-monotonic version
on the left, players with a higher cost have a lower quality. In the co-monotonic version
on the right, players with a higher cost have a higher quality. There are two pure-
strategy Nash outcomes for each version: all links form or no links form. “All links
form” is the unique PCE outcome in the anti-monotonic case, while both “all links”
and “no links” are PCE outcomes under co-monotonicity.
Anti-Monotonic
Player Cost Quality
North-1 14 30
North-2 19 10
South-1 14 30
South-2 19 10
Co-Monotonic
Player Cost Quality
North-1 14 10
North-2 19 30
South-1 14 10
South-2 19 30
The compatibility structure with respect to own quality is reversed between these
two versions of the game. In both versions, ActiveN1 % ActiveN2, but N1 has high
quality in the anti-monotonic version, and low quality in the co-monotonic version.
16
Thus, in the anti-monotonic version but not in the co-monotonic version, player-
compatible trembles lead to the high-quality counterparty choosing Active at least
as often as the low-quality counterparty, which means Active has a positive expected
payoff even when one’s own cost is high. For this reason, the set of PCE is different
in these two cases. In contrast, the set of equilibria that satisfy extended proper
equilibrium, proper equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, p-dominance,
Pareto efficiency, and strategic stability do not depend on whether payoffs are co- or
anti-monotonic, as shown in the Online Appendix.
3.3 Signaling Games
Recall that a signaling game is a two-player Bayesian game, where P1 is a sender who
knows her own type θ, and P2 only knows that P1’s type is drawn according to the
distribution λ ∈ ∆(Θ) on a finite type space Θ. After learning her type, the sender
sends a signal s ∈ S to the receiver. Then, the receiver responds with an action
a ∈ A. Utilities depend on the sender’s type θ, the signal s, and the action a.
Fudenberg and He (2018)’s compatibility criterion is defined only for signaling
games. It does not use limits of games with trembles, but instead restricts the beliefs
that the receiver can have about the sender’s type. That sort of restriction does not
seem easy to generalize beyond games with observed actions, while using trembles
allows us to define PCE for general strategic form games. As we will see, the more
general PCE definition implies the compatibility criterion in signaling games.
With each sender type viewed as a different player, this game has |Θ|+ 1 players,
I = Θ ∪ {2}, where the strategy set of each sender type θ is Sθ = S while the
strategy set of the receiver is S2 = AS, the set of signal-contingent plans. So a mixed
strategy of θ is a possibly mixed signal choice σ1(·|θ) ∈ ∆(S), while a mixed strategy
σ2 ∈ ∆(AS) of the receiver is a mixed plan about how to respond to each signal.
Fudenberg and He (2018) define type compatibility for signaling games. A signal
s∗ is more type-compatible with θ than θ′ if for every behavioral strategy σ2,
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u1(s∗, σ2; θ
′) ≥ max
s′ 6=s∗
u1(s
′
, σ2; θ
′)
implies
u1(s∗, σ2; θ) > max
s′ 6=s∗
u1(s
′
, σ2; θ).
They also define the compatibility criterion, which imposes restrictions on off-path
beliefs in signaling games. Consider a Nash equilibrium σ∗1, σ∗2. For any signal s∗ and
receiver action a with σ∗2(a | s∗) > 0, the compatibility criterion requires that a best
responds to some belief p ∈ ∆(Θ) about the sender’s type such that, whenever s∗ is
more type-compatible with θ than with θ′ and s∗ is not equilibrium dominated9 for
θ, p satisfies p(θ
′ )
p(θ) ≤ λ(θ
′ )
λ(θ) .
Since every totally mixed strategy of the receiver is payoff-equivalent to a behav-
ioral strategy, it is easy to see that type compatibility implies s∗θ % s∗θ′ .
10 The next
result shows that when specialized to signaling games, all PCE pass the compatibility
criterion.
Proposition 4. In a signaling game, every PCE σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium satisfying
the compatibility criterion of Fudenberg and He (2018).
This proposition in particular implies that in the beer-quiche game of Cho and
Kreps (1987), the quiche-pooling equilibrium is not a PCE, as it does not satisfy the
compatibility criterion.
9Signal s∗ is not equilibrium dominated for θ if maxa∈A u1(s∗, a; θ) > u1(s1, σ∗2 ; θ) for every s1
with σ∗1(s1 | θ) > 0.
10The converse does not hold. We defined type compatibility to require testing against all receiver
strategies and not just the totally mixed ones, so it is possible that s∗θ % s∗θ′ but s
∗ is not more type-
compatible with θ than with θ′ ,so type-compatibility is harder to satisfy than player compatibility.
We now realize that we could have restricted type compatibility to only consider totally mixed
strategies, and all of the results of Fudenberg and He (2018) would still hold.
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4 Factorability and Isomorphic Factoring
This section defines a “factorability” condition that we will use in developing a learn-
ing foundation for PCE. Factorability implies that the information gathered from
playing one strategy is not at all informative about the payoff consequences of any
other strategy. We then define a notion of “isomorphic factoring” for players i and
j to formalize the idea that the learning problems faced by these two players are
essentially the same. The next section will provide a learning foundation for the
compatibility restriction for pairs of players whose learning problems are isomorphic
in this way. The examples discussed in Section 3 are factorable and isomorphically
factorable for players ranked by compatibility.
4.1 Definition and Motivation
We begin by introducing some notation. Fix an extensive-form game Γ as the stage
game, with players i ∈ I along with a player 0 to model Nature’s moves. The collection
of information sets of player i ∈ I is written as Hi. At each h ∈ Hi, player i chooses
an action ah, from the finite set of possible actions Ah. So an extensive-form pure
strategy of i specifies an action at each information set h ∈ Hi. We denote by Si the
set of all such strategies. For simplicity, throughout we will maintain the following
assumption.
Assumption 1. Each player moves at most once along any path of play in Γ.
In addition to any information a player gets in the course of play, we assume that
after each play each player observes her own payoff. In general, this need not perfectly
reveal other players’ actions at all information sets. We now define factorability, which
roughly says that playing strategy si against any strategy profile of −i identifies all
of opponents’ actions that can be payoff-relevant for si, but does not reveal any
information about the payoff consequences of any other strategy s′i 6= si.
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For an information set h of j with j 6= i, write Ph for the partition on S−i where
two strategies s−i, s
′
−i are in the same element of the partition if they prescribe the
same play on h. Thus partition Ph contains perfect information about play on h, but
no other information.
Definition. For each player i and strategy si ∈ Si, let Πi[si] be the coarsest partition
of S−i that makes s−i 7→ Ui(si, s−i) measurable. The game Γ is factorable for i if:
1. For each si ∈ Si there exists a (possibly empty) collection of −i’s information
sets Fi[si] ⊆ H−i so that Πi[si] = ∨h∈Fi[si] Ph. (The meet across an empty
collection is the coarsest possible partition on S−i, i.e. no information).
2. For two strategies si 6= s′i, Fi[si] ∩ Fi[s′i] = ∅.
When Γ is factorable for i, we refer to Fi[si] as the si-relevant information sets, a
terminology we now justify. In general, i’s payoff from playing si can depend on the
profile of −i’s actions at all opponent information sets. Condition (1) implies only
opponents’ actions on Fi[si] matter for i’s payoff after choosing si, and furthermore
this dependence is one-to-one. That is,
U (si, s−i) = U
(
si, s
′
−i
)
⇔
(
∀h ∈ Fi [si] s−i (h) = s′−i (h)
)
. The substantive restriction in Condition (1) is that i’s learning cannot be blocked
by another player — by choosing si, i can always identify actions on Fi[si] regardless
of what happens elsewhere in the game tree.11
Condition (2) implies that i does not learn about the payoff consequence of a
different strategy s′i 6= si through playing si (provided i’s prior is independent about
opponents’ play on different information sets). This is because there is no intersection
between the si-relevant information sets and the s
′
i-relevant ones. In particular this
means that player i cannot “free ride” on others’ experiments and learn about the
11It is easy but expositionally costly to extend this to the case where several actions on Ah lead
to the same payoff for i.
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consequences of various risky strategies while playing a safe one that is myopically
optimal.
If Fi[si] is empty, then si is a kind of “opt out” action for i. After choosing si, i
receives the same utility from every reachable terminal node and gets no information
about the payoff consequences of any of her other strategies.
4.2 Examples of Factorable Games
We now illustrate factorability using the examples from Section 3 and some other
general classes of games.
4.2.1 The Restaurant Game
Consider the restaurant game from Example 1. Since x < −1 and y > 0.5, we have
x 6= y and x 6= y+ 0.5. By choosing R, the customer’s payoff perfectly reveals others’
play. By choosing Z, the customer always gets 0 payoff (these nodes are colored in
the diagram below) and so cannot infer anyone else’s play.
The restaurant game is factorable for the Critic and the Diner. Let Fi[Ri] consist
of the two information sets of −i and let Fi[Zi] be the empty set for each i ∈ {1, 2}.It
is easy to verify that the two conditions of factorability are satisfied.
It is important for factorability that a customer who takes the “outside option”
of ordering pizza gets the same payoff regardless of the restaurant’s play, and does
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not observe the restaurant’s quality choice even if the other customer patronizes the
restaurant. Factorability rules out this sort of “free information,” so that when we
analyze the non-equilibrium learning problem we know that each agent can only learn
a strategy’s payoff consequences by playing it herself.
4.2.2 The Link-Formation Game
Consider the link-formation game from Example 2. The payoff for a player choosing
Inactive is always 0, whereas the payoff for a player choosing Active exactly iden-
tifies the play of the two players on the opposite side. It is now easy to see that we
can let Fi[Activei] consists of the information sets of the other two agents on the
other side of i and let Fi[Inactivei] be empty. This specification of the si-relevant
information sets shows the stage game is factorable for every player.
4.2.3 Binary Participation Games
More generally, Γ is factorable for i whenever it is a binary participation game for i.
Definition. Γ is a binary participation game for i if the following are satisfied.
1. i has a unique information set with two actions, without loss labeled In and
Out.
2. All paths of play in Γ pass through i’s information set.
3. All paths of play where i plays In pass through the same information sets.
4. Terminal vertices associated with i playing Out all have the same payoff for i.
5. Terminal vertices associated with i playing In all have different payoffs for i.
Action Out is an outside option for i that leads to a constant payoff regardless of
others’ play. We are implicitly assuming in part (5) of the definition that the game
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has generic payoffs for i after choosing In, in the sense that changing the action at
any one information set on the path of play will change i’s payoff.
If Γ is a binary participation game for i, then let Fi[In] be the common collection
of −i information sets encountered in paths of play where i chooses In. Let Fi[Out]
be the empty set. We see that Γ is factorable for i. Clearly Fi[In] ∩ Fi[Out] = ∅,
so Condition (2) of factorability is satisfied. When i chooses the strategy In, the
tree structure of Γ implies different profiles of play on Fi[In] must lead to different
terminal nodes, the generic payoff condition means Condition (1) of factorability is
satisfied for strategy In. When i plays Out, i gets the same payoff regardless of the
others’ play, so Condition (1) of factorability is satisfied for strategy Out.
The restaurant game with is a binary participation game for the critic and the
diner, where ordering pizza is the outside option. The link-formation game is a binary
participation game for every player, where Inactive is the outside option.
4.2.4 Signaling to Multiple Audiences
To give a different class of examples of factorable games, consider a game of signaling
to one or more audiences. To be precise, Nature moves first and chooses a type
for the sender, drawn according to λ ∈ ∆(Θ), where Θ is a finite set. The sender
then chooses a signal s ∈ S, observed by all receivers r1, ..., rnr . Each receiver then
simultaneously chooses an action. The profile of receiver actions, together with the
sender’s type and signal, determine payoffs for all players. Viewing different types
of senders as different players, this game is factorable for all sender types, provided
payoffs are generic. This is because for each type i we have Fi[s] is the set of nr
information sets by the receivers after seeing signal s.
4.3 Examples of Non-Factorable Games
The next result gives a necessary condition for factorability. Suppose H is an informa-
tion set of player j 6= i. Player i’s payoff is independent of h if ui(ah, a−h) = ui(a′h, a−h)
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for all ah, a
′
h, a−h, where ah, a
′
h are actions on information set h, and a−h is a profile of
actions on all other information sets in the game tree. If i’s payoff is not independent
of the action taken at some information set h, then i can always put h onto the path
of play via a unilateral deviation at one of her information sets.
Proposition 5. Suppose the game is factorable for i and i’s payoff is not independent
of h∗. For any strategy profile, either h∗ is on the path of play, or i has a deviation
at one of her information sets that puts h∗ onto the path of play.
This result follows from two lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any game factorable for i and any information set h∗ for player
j 6= i where j has at least two different actions, if h∗ ∈ Fi[si] for some extensive-form
strategy si ∈ Si, then h∗ is always on the path of play when i chooses si.
Lemma 2. For any game factorable for i and any information set h∗ of player j 6= i,
suppose i’s payoff is not independent of h∗. Then: (i) j has at least two different
actions on h∗; (ii) there exists some extensive-form strategy si ∈ Si so that h∗ ∈ Fi[si].
We can combine these two lemmas to prove the proposition.
Proof. By combining Lemmas 1 and 2, there exists some extensive-form strategy
si ∈ Si so that h∗ is on the path of play whenever i chooses si. Consider some
strategy profile (s◦i , s◦−i) where h∗ is off the path. Then i can unilaterally deviate to
si, and h∗ is on the path of (si, s◦−i). Furthermore, i’s play differs on the new path
relative to the old path on exactly one information set, since i plays at most once on
any path. So instead of deviating to si, i can deviate to s
′
i that matches si in terms
of this information set where i’s play is modified, but otherwise is the same as s◦i .
So h∗ is also on the path of play for (s′i, s◦−i), where s
′
i differs from s◦i only on one
information set.
Consider the centipede game for three players below.
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Each player moves at most once on each path, and 1 and 2’s payoffs are not
independent of the (unique) information set of player 3. But, if both 1 and 2 choose
“drop”, then no one step deviation by either 1 or 2 can put the information set of 3
onto the path of play. Proposition 5 thus implies the centipede game is not factorable
for either 1 or 2. Moreover, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) showed that in this game
even very patient player 2’s may not learn to play a best response to player 3, so
that the outcome (drop, drop, pass) can persist even though it is not trembling-hand
perfect. Intuitively, if the player 1’s only play pass as experiments, then when the
fraction of new players is very small, the player 2’s may not get to play often enough
to make experimentation with pass worthwhile.
As another example, the Selten’s horse game displayed above is not factorable
for 1 or 2 if the payoffs are generic, even though the conclusion of Proposition 5 is
satisfied. The information set of 3 must belong to both F1[Down] and F1[Across],
because 3’s play can affect 1’s payoff even if 1 chooses Across, as 2 could choose
Down. This violates the factorability requirement that F1[Down] ∩ F1[Across] = ∅.
The same argument shows the information set of 3 must belong to both F2[Down]
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and F2[Across], since when 1 chooses Down the play of 3 affects 2’s payoff regardless
of 2’s play. So, again, F2[Down] ∩ F2[Across] = ∅ is violated.
Condition (2) of factorability also rules out games where i has two strategies
that give the same information, but one strategy always has a worse payoff under
all profiles of opponents’ play. In this case, we can think of the worse strategy as
an informationally equivalent but more costly experiment than the better strategy.
Reasonable learning rules (including rational learning) will not use such strategies,
but we do not capture that in the general definition of PCE because our setup there
only consider abstract strategy spaces Si and not an extensive-form game tree.12
4.4 Isomorphic Factoring
Before we turn to compare the learning behavior of agents i and j, we must deal
with one final issue. To make sensible comparisons between strategies s∗i and s∗j of
two different players i 6= j in a learning setting, we must make assumptions on their
informational value about the play of others: namely, the information i gets from
choosing s∗i must be essentially the same as the information that j gets from choosing
s∗j . To do this we require that the game be factorable for both i and j, and that the
factoring is “isomorphic” for these two players.
Definition. When Γ is factorable for both i and j, the factoring is isomorphic for i
and j if there exists a bijection ϕ : Si → Sj such that Fi[si]∩H−ij = Fj[ϕ(si)]∩H−ij
for every si ∈ Si.
This says the si-relevant information sets (for i) are the same as the ϕ(si)-relevant
information sets (for j), insofar as the actions of −ij are concerned. For example,
the restaurant game is isomorphically factorable for the critic and the diner (under
the isomorphism ϕ(R1)=R2, ϕ(Z1)=Z2) because F1[In1] ∩ H3 = F2[In2] ∩ H3 =
the singleton set containing the unique information set of the restaurant. As another
12It would be interesting to try to refine the definition of PCE to capture this, perhaps using the
“signal function” approach of Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994).
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example, all signaling games (with possibly many receivers as in Section 4.2.4) are
isomorphically factorable for the different types of the sender. Similarly, the link-
formation game is isomorphically factorable for pairs (N1, N2), and (S1, S2), but
note that it is not isomorphically factorable for (N1, S1).
5 Learning Foundations
In this section, we provide a learning foundation for PCE’s cross-player tremble re-
strictions. Our main learning result, Theorem 2, studies long-lived agents who get
permanently assigned into player roles and face a fixed but unknown distribution of
opponents’ play. We prove that when s∗i % s∗j and the game is isomorphically fac-
torable for i and j, agents in the role of i use s∗i more frequently than agents in the role
of j use s∗j . We obtain this result both for rational agents who maximize discounted
expected utility, and for boundedly-rational agents who employ the computationally
simpler Bayes-upper confidence bound algorithm. Under either of these behavioral
assumptions, “trembles” emerge endogenously during learning as deliberate experi-
ments that seek to learn opponents’ play.
5.1 Learning Rules and Learning Environments
We consider an agent born into player role i who maintains this role throughout
her life. She has a geometrically distributed lifetime with 0 ≤ γ < 1 probability of
survival between periods. Each period, the agent plays the stage game Γ, choosing a
strategy si ∈ Si. The agent observes and collects her payoffs at the end of the game.
Then, with probability γ, she continues into the next period and plays the stage game
again. With complementary probability, she exits the system. Thus each period the
agent observes her own payoff.13 We assume that players have perfect recall, so she
also remembers her chosen strategy.
13This is a special case of the terminal-node partitions of Fudenberg and Kamada (2015, 2018)
where the elements of each player’s terminal node partition are isomorphic to their possible payoffs.
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Definition. The set of all finite histories of all lengths for i is Yi := ∪t≥0(Si×R)t. For
a history yi ∈ Yi and si ∈ Si, the subhistory yi,si is the (possibly empty) subsequence
of yi where the agent played si.
When Γ is factorable for i, there is a one-to-one mapping from the set of ac-
tion profiles on the si-relevant information sets to the range of s−i 7→ Ui(si, s−i), as
required by the first condition of the factorability definition. Through this identifi-
cation, we may think of each one-period history where i plays si as an element of
{si} × (×H∈Fi[si]Ah) instead of an element of {si} × R. This convention will make it
easier to compare histories of different player roles.
Notation 1. A history yi will also refer to an element of ∪t≥0
(
∪si∈Si
[
{si} × (×h∈Fi[si]Ah)
])
t.
The agent decides on which strategy to use in each period based on her history
so far. This mapping is her learning rule.
Definition. A learning rule ri : Yi → Si specifies a pure strategy in the stage game
after each history.
Note that the learning rules depend only on what the agent has observed in past
play; the effect of anything learned during the play of the current stage game is
captured by the specified strategy. Note also that since the agent’s play in each
period depends on her past observations, the sequence of her plays is a stochastic
process whose distribution depends on the distribution of the opponents’ play. We
assume that there is a fixed objective distribution of opponent’s play, which we call
player i′s learning environment. The leading case of this is when there are multiple
populations of learners, one for each player role, and the aggregate system is in a
steady state. But, when analyzing the play of a single agent, we remain agnostic
about the reason why opponents’ play is i.i.d.
Definition. A learning environment for player i is a probability distribution σ−i ∈∏
j 6=i∆(Sj) over strategies of players −i.
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The learning environment, together with the agent’s learning rule, generate a
stochastic process X ti describing i’s strategy in period t.
Definition. Let X ti be the Si-valued random variable representing i’s play in period t.
Player i’s induced response of i to σ−i under learning rule ri is φi(·; ri, σ−i) : Si → [0, 1],
where for each si ∈ Si we have
φi(si; ri, σ−i) := (1− γ)
∞∑
t=1
γt−1 · Pri,σ−i{X ti = si}.
We can interpret the induced response φi(·; ri, σ−i) as a mixed strategy for i rep-
resenting i’s weighted lifetime average play, where the weight on X ti , the strategy she
uses in period t of her life, is proportional to the probability γt−1 of surviving into that
period. The induced response has a population interpretation as well. Suppose there
is a continuum of agents in the society, each engaged in their own copy of the learning
problem above. In each period, enough new agents are added to the society to exactly
balance out the share of agents who exit between periods. Then φi(·; ri, σ−i) describes
the distribution on Si we would find if we sample an individual uniformly at random
from the subpopulation for role of i and ask her which si ∈ Si they plan on playing
today.
Our learning foundation for compatible trembles involves comparing the induced
responses of different player roles with the same learning rule and in the same learning
environment.
5.2 Two Models of Learning and Experimentation
We will consider two different specifications of the agents’ learning rules in factorable
games, namely the maximization of expected discounted utility and the Bayes upper
confidence bound heuristic. With both rules, agents form a Bayesian belief over
opponents’ play, independent at different information sets. More precisely, we will
assume that each agent i starts with a regular independent prior:
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Definition. Agent i has a regular independent prior if her beliefs gi on ×h∈H−i∆(Ah)
can be written as the product of full-support marginal densities on ∆(Ah) across
different h ∈ H−i, so that gi((αh)h∈H−i) =
∏
h∈H−i g
h
i (αh) with ghi (αh) > 0 for all
αh ∈ ∆◦(Ah).
Thus, the agent holds a belief about the distribution of actions at each14 −i
information set h, and thinks actions at different information sets are generated in-
dependently, whether the information sets belong to the same player or to different
ones. Furthermore, the agent holds independent beliefs about the randomizing prob-
abilities at different information sets.15 The agent updates gi by applying the Bayes’
rule to her history yi. If the stage game is a signaling game, for example, this in-
dependence assumption means that the senders only update their beliefs about the
receiver’s response to a given signal s based on the responses received to that signal,
and that their beliefs about this response do not depend on the responses they have
observed to other signals s′ 6= s.
If i starts with independent prior beliefs in a stage game factorable for i, the
learning problem she faces is a combinatorial bandit problem. A combinatorial bandit
consist of a set of basic arms, each with an unknown distribution of outcomes, together
with a collection of subsets of basic arms called super arms. Each period, the agent
must choose a super arm, which results in pulling all of the basic arms in that subset
and obtaining a utility based on the outcomes of these pulls. To translate into our
language, each basic arm corresponds to a −i information set h and the super arms
are identified with strategies si ∈ Si. The subset of basic arms in si are the si-relevant
information sets, Fi[si]. The collection of outcomes from these basic arms, i.e. the
action profile (ah)h∈Fi[si], determine i’s payoff, Ui(si, (ah)h∈Fi[si]).
14We assume that agents do not know Nature’s mixed actions, which must be learned just as the
play of other players. If agents know Nature’s move, then the a regular independent prior would be
a density gi on ×h∈HI\{i}∆(Ah), so that gi((αh)HI\{i}) =
∏
h∈HI\{i} g
h
i (αh) with ghi (αh) > 0 for all
αh ∈ ∆◦(Ah).
15As Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) point out, an agent who believes two opponents are randomizing
independently may nevertheless have subjective correlation in her uncertainty about the randomizing
probabilities of these opponents.
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A special case of combinatorial bandits is additive separability, where the outcome
from pulling each basic arm is simply a R-valued reward, and the payoff from choosing
a super arm is the sum of these rewards. This corresponds to the stage game being
additively separable for i.
Definition. A factorable game Γ is additively separable for i if there is a collection
of auxiliary functions ui,h : Ah → R such that Ui(si, (ah)h∈Fi[si]) =
∑
h∈Fi[si] ui,h(ah).
The term ui,h(ah) is the “reward” of action ah towards i’s payoff. The total payoff
from si is the sum of such rewards over all si-relevant information sets. A factorable
game is not additively separable for i when the opponents’ actions on Fi[si] interact in
some way to determine i’s payoff following si. All the examples discussed in Section 3
are additively separable for the players ranked by compatibility.16 While we provide
our learning foundation for rational agents in any factorable game, our analysis of
the Bayes upper confidence bound algorithm will restrict to such additively separable
games.
5.2.1 Expected Discounted Utility and the Gittins Index
Consider a rational agent who maximizes discounted expected utility. In addition to
the survival chance 0 ≤ γ < 1 between periods, the agent further discount future
payoff according to her patience 0 ≤ δ < 1, so her overall effective discount factor is
0 ≤ δγ < 1.
Given a belief about the distribution of play at each opponent information set H,
we may calculate the Gittins index of each strategy si ∈ Si, corresponding to a super
arm in in the combinatorial bandit problem. We write the solution to the rational
16Additive separability is trivially satisfied whenever |Fi[si]| ≤ 1 for each si, so that is there is at
most one si-relevant information set for each strategy si of i. So, every signaling game is additively
separable for every sender type. It is also satisfied in the link-formation game in Section 4.2.2
even though here |Fi[Active i]| = 2, as each agent computes her payoff by summing her linking
costs/benefits with respect to each potential counterparty. Additive separability is also satisfied
in the restaurant game in Section 4.2.1 for each customer i. Fi[Ri] contains two information sets,
corresponding to the play of the Restaurant and the other customer. The play of the other customer
additively contributes either 0 or -0.5 to i’s payoff, depending on whether they choose R or not.
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agent’s dynamic optimization problem as OPTi, which involves playing the strategy
si with the highest Gittins index after each history yi.
The drawback of this learning rule is that the Gittins index is computationally
intractable even in simple bandit problems. The combinatorial structure of our bandit
problem makes computing the index even more complex, as it needs to consider the
evolution of beliefs about each basic arm.
5.2.2 Bayesian Upper-Confidence Bound
The Bayesian upper confidence bound (Bayes-UCB) procedure was first proposed by
Kaufmann, Cappé, and Garivier (2012) as a computationally tractable algorithm for
dealing with the exploration-exploitation trade-off in bandit problems.
We restrict attention to games additively separable for i and adopt a variant of
Bayes-UCB. Every yi,h subhistory of play on h ∈ Fi[si] induces a posterior belief
gi(·|yi,h) over play on h, so gi(·|yi,h) is an element of ∆(∆(Ah)). By an abuse of
notation, we use ui,h(gi(·|yi,h)) ∈ ∆(R) to mean the distribution over contributions
for play distributed according to gi(·|yi,h). As a final bit of notation, when F is a
distribution on R, Q(F ; q) is the q-quantile of F .
Definition. Let prior gi and quantile-choice function q : N → [0, 1] be given for i.
The Bayes-UCB index for si after history yi (relative to gi and q) is
∑
h∈Fi[si]
Q( ui,h(gi(·|yi,h)) ; q(#(si|yi)) ),
where #(si|yi) is the number of times si has been used in history yi.
In words, our Bayes-UCB index computes the q-th quantile of ui,h(ah) under i’s
belief about −i’s play on h, then sums these quantiles to return an index of the
strategy si. The Bayes-UCB policy UCBi prescribes choosing the strategy with the
highest Bayes-UCB index after every history.
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This procedure embodies a kind of wishful thinking for q ≥ 0.5. The agent
optimistically evaluates the payoff consequence of each si under the assessment that
opponents will play a favorable response to si at each of the si-relevant information
sets, where greater q corresponds to greater optimism in this evaluation procedure.
Indeed, if q approaches 1 for every si, the Bayes-UCB procedure approaches picking
the strategy with the highest potential payoff.
If Fi[si] consists of only a single information set of for every si, then the procedure
we define is the standard Bayes-UCB policy. In general, our procedure differs from
the usual Bayes-UCB procedure, which would instead compute
Q
 ∑
h∈Fi[si]
ui,h(gi(·|yi,h)); q(#(si|yi))
 .
Instead, our procedure computes the sum of the quantiles, which is easier than com-
puting the quantile of the sum, a calculation that requires taking the convolution of
the associated distributions.
This variant of the Bayesian UCB is analogous to variants of the non-Bayesian
UCB algorithm17 (see e.g. Gai, Krishnamachari, and Jain (2012) and Chen, Wang,
and Yuan (2013)) that separately compute an index for each basic arm and choose
the super arm maximizing sum of the basic arm indices.18
5.2.3 Index policies
The analysis that follows makes heavy use of the fact that the Gittins index and the
Bayes-UCB are index policies in the following sense:
Definition. When Γ is factorable for i, a learning rule ri : Yi → Si is an index
policy if there exist functions (ιsi)si∈Si with each ιsi mapping subhistories of si to real
17The non-Bayesian UCB index of a basic arm is an “optimistic” estimate of its mean reward that
combines its empirical mean in the past with a term inversely proportional to the number of times
the basic arm has been pulled.
18Kveton, Wen, Ashkan, and Szepesvari (2015) have established tight O(
√
n logn) regret bounds
for this kind of algorithm across n periods.
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numbers, such that ri(yi) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
{ιsi(yi,si)}.
If an agent uses an index policy, we can think of her behavior in the following
way. At each history, she computes an index for each strategy si ∈ Si based on the
subhistory of those periods where she chose si,and she then plays a strategy with the
highest index with probability 1.19
5.3 Induced Responses Respect Player Compatibility
We now analyze how compatibility relations in the stage game translate into restric-
tions on experimentation frequencies. We aim to demonstrate that if s∗i % s∗j , then i’s
induced response plays s∗i more frequently than j’s induced response plays s∗j . There
is little hope of proving a comparative result of this kind if i and j face completely
unrelated learning problems. Instead, we will require that i and j use the same learn-
ing rule with the same parameters (that is, the same patience in the case of OPT and
same quantile-choice function in the case of UCB), start with the same prior belief20
about −ij’s play, and face the same distribution of −ij’s play. These assumptions
are natural when a common population of agents get randomly assigned into player
roles, such as in a lab experiment.
Theorem 2 shows that when i and j use the same learning rule and face the
same learning environment, we have φi(s∗i ; ri, σ−i) ≥ φj(s∗j ; ri;σ−j). This provides
a microfoundation for the compatibility-based cross-player restrictions on trembles.
Throughout, we will fix a stage game Γ that is isomorphically factorable for i and j,
with isomorphism ϕ : Si → Sj between their strategies.
Definition. Regular independent priors for i and j are equivalent if for each si ∈ Si
and h ∈ Fi[si] ∩ Fj[ϕ(si)], ghi (α) = ghj (α) for all α ∈ ∆(Ah).
19To handle possible ties, we can introduce a strict order over each agent’s strategy set, and specify
that if two strategies have the same index the agent plays the one that is higher ranked.
20We believe that that our learning foundation for player-compatible trembles continues to hold
even when i and j start with different priors under a stronger version of the compatibility condition
that converges to the current one as the priors become closer together, but we have not been able
to prove this.
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Theorem 2. Suppose s∗i % s∗j with ϕ(s∗i ) = s∗j . Consider two learning agents in
the roles of i and j with equivalent independent regular priors.21 For any common
survival chance 0 ≤ γ < 1 and any mixed strategy profile σ, we have φi(s∗i ; ri, σ−i) ≥
φj(s∗j ; rj, σ−j) under either of the following conditions:
• ri = OPTi, rj = OPTj, and i and j have the same patience 0 ≤ δ < 1.
• The stage game is additively separable for i and j, at every h ∈ H−ij the
auxiliary functions ui,h, uj,h rank α ∈ ∆(Ah) in the same way, ri = UCBi,
rj = UCBj, i and j have the same quantile-choice function qi = qj.
This result provides learning foundations for player-compatible trembles in a num-
ber of games, including the restaurant game from Section 4.2.1 and the link-formation
game from Section 4.2.2, where the additive separability and same-ranking assump-
tions are satisfied for players ranked by compatibility.
5.4 Proof Outline for Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 follows two steps. In Proposition 6, we abstract away from
particular models of experimentation and consider two general index policies ri, rj in
a stage game that is isomorphically factorable for i and j. Policy ri is more compatible
with s∗i than rj is with s∗j if, following i and j’s respective histories yi, yj that contain
the same observations about the play of third parties −ij, whenever s∗j has the highest
index under rj, then no s
′
i 6= s∗i has the highest index under ri. We prove that for
any index policies ri, rj where ri is more compatible with s∗i than rj is with s∗j , we
get φi(s∗i ; ri, σ−i) ≥ φj(s∗j ; rj, σ−j) in any learning environment σ. In Corollaries 1
and 2, we show that under the conditions of Theorem 2 that relate i and j’s learning
problems to each other (e.g. i and j have equivalent regular priors, same patience
21The theorem easily generalizes to the case where i starts with one of L ≥ 2 possible priors
g
(1)
i , ..., g
(L)
i with probabilities p1, ..., pL and j starts with priors g
(1)
j , ..., g
(L)
j with the same proba-
bilities, and each g(l)i , g
(l)
j is a pair of equivalent regular priors for 1 ≤ l ≤ L.
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level, etc.), the compatibility relation s∗i % s∗j implies OPTi is more compatible with
s∗i than OPTj is with s∗j , and that the same is true for UCBi and UCBj.
5.4.1 Comparative Compatibility for Index Policies
We begin by introducing a notion of equivalence between the histories of i and j.
Since i could observe j’s play and vice versa, this equivalence is only defined in terms
of the actions of the −ij third parties.
Definition. For Γ isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(si) = sj, i’s subhistory
yi,si is third-party equivalent to j’s subhistory yj,sj , written as yi,si ∼ yj,sj , if they
contain the same sequence of observations about the actions of −ij.
Recall that, by Notation 1, we identify each subhistory yi,si with a sequence in
×h∈Fi[si]AH and each subhistory yj,sj with a sequence in ×h∈Fj [sj ]Ah. By isomorphic
factorability, Fi[si] ∩ H−ij = Fj[sj] ∩ H−ij. Third-party equivalence of yi,si and yj,sj
says i has played si as many times as j has played sj, and that the sequence of −ij’s
actions that i encountered from experimenting with si are the same as those that j
encountered from experimenting with sj.
As an example, the following histories for the critic and the diner of the restaurant
game are third-party equivalent for the strategy R. This is because the subhistories
yCritic,R and yDiner,R contain the same sequences of the restaurant’s play (even though
the two agents have different observations in terms of how often the other patron goes
to the restaurant).
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yCritic :
period 1 2 3 4 5
own strategy R Z Z Z R
others’ play (L,Z) ∅ ∅ ∅ (H,Z)
yDiner :
period 1 2 3 4
own strategy Z R Z R
others’ play ∅ (L,R) ∅ (H,Z)
Table 1: The two histories yCritic (with length 5) and yDiner (with length 4) have third-
party equivalent subhistories for R. The row “others’ play” show what the agent infers
about others’ play from her payoffs — recall that a customer choosing Z always gets
the same payoff and so cannot infer anything about how others play.
We use third-party equivalent histories to define a comparison between two ab-
stract index policies.
Definition. Suppose Γ is isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(s∗i ) = s∗j . For
two index policies ri and rj, we have ri is more compatible with s∗i than than rj is
with s∗j if for any histories yi, yj and strategy s
′
i ∈ Si, s′i 6= s∗i satisfying
1. yi,s∗i ∼ yj,s∗j and yi,s′i ∼ yj,ϕ(s′i)
2. s∗j has weakly the highest index for j,
s
′
i does not have the weakly highest index for i.
This definition is a property of the index policies ri, rj, and does not make reference
to payoffs in the underlying stage game. The comparison applies to pairs of policies
ri, rj such that whenever the subhistories of yi for strategies s∗i and s
′
i 6= s∗i are third-
party equivalent to subhistories of yj for s∗j and ϕ(s
′
i), and s∗j has the highest rj-index
at history yj, then s
′
i does not have the highest ri-index under yi.
We can now state the first intermediary result we need to establish Theorem 2,
which is about the relative experimentation frequencies generated by a pair of index
policies where the compatibility relation applies.
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Proposition 6. Suppose Γ is isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(s∗i ) = s∗j ,
and that index policy ri is more compatible with s∗i than index policy rj is with s∗j .
Then φi(s∗i ; ri, σ−i) ≥ φj(s∗j ; rj, σ−j) for any 0 ≤ γ < 1 and σ ∈ ×k∆(Sk).
The proof extends the coupling argument in the proof of Fudenberg and He
(2018)’s Lemma 2, which only applies to the Gittins index in signaling games, and also
fills in a missing step (lemma 4) that the earlier proof implicitly assumed. Proposi-
tion 6 applies to any index policies satisfying the comparative compatibility condition
stated above. The proof uses this hypothesis to deduce a general conclusion about
the induced responses of these agents in the learning problem, where the two agents
typically do not have third-party equivalent histories in any given period.
To deal with the issue that i and j learn from endogenous data that diverge as
they undertake different experiments, we couple the learning problems of i and j
using what we call response paths A ∈ (×h∈HAh)∞. For each such path and learning
rule ri for player i, imagine running the rule against the data-generating process
where the k-th time i plays si, i observes the action ak,h ∈ Ah at the information set
h ∈ Fi[si]. Given a learning rule ri, each A induces a deterministic infinite history
of i’s strategies yi(A, ri) ∈ (Si)∞. We show that under the hypothesis that ri is more
compatible with s∗i than rj is with s∗j , the weighted lifetime frequency of s∗i in yi(A, ri)
is larger than that of s∗j in yj(A, rj) for every A, where play in different periods of the
infinite histories yi(A, ri), yj(A, rj) are weighted by the probabilities of surviving into
these periods, just as in the definition of induced responses.
Lemma 4 in the Appendix shows that when i and j face i.i.d. draws of opponents’
play from a fixed learning environment σ, the induced responses are the same as if
they each faced a random response path A drawn at birth according to the (infi-
nite) product measure over (×h∈HAh)∞ whose marginal distribution on each copy of
×h∈HAh corresponds to σ.
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5.4.2 OPT and UCB Satisfy Comparative Compatibility
The second step of our proof is carried out in Appendix 8. There, Corollaries 1 and
2 show that when the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold and s∗i % s∗j , both OPT and
UCB are more compatible with s∗i than with s∗j provided the additional regularity
conditions of Theorem 2 hold. This proves the theorem and provides two learning
models that microfound PCE’s tremble restrictions.22 Since the compatibility relation
is defined in the language of best responses against opponents’ strategy profiles in the
stage game, the key step in showing that OPT and UCB satisfy the comparative
compatibility condition involves reformulating these indices as the expected utility of
using each strategy against a certain opponent strategy profile.
For the Gittins index, this profile is the “synthetic” opponent strategy profile
constructed from the best stopping rule in the auxiliary optimal-stopping problem
defining the index. This is similar to the construction of Fudenberg and He (2018),
but in the more general setting of this paper the arguments become more subtle. The
induced synthetic strategy may be correlated if the learner observes opponents’ play at
multiple information sets after playing si, even if the learner starts with independent
prior beliefs over play at these information. For example, suppose Fi[si] consists of
two information sets, one for each of two players k1 6= k2, whose choose between
Heads and Tails. Agent i’s prior belief is that each of k1, k2 is either always playing
Heads or always playing Tails, with each of the 4 possible combinations of strategies
given 25% prior probability. Now consider the stopping rule where i stops if k1 and
k2 play differently in the first period, but continues for 100 more periods if they play
the same action in the first period. Then the procedure defined above generates a
distribution over pairs of Heads and Tails that is mostly given by play in periods
2 through 100, which is either (Heads, Heads) or (Tails, Tails), each with 50%
probability. Thus the stopping rule τ creates correlation in the observed play of the
22Other natural index rules that we do not analyze explicitly here also serve as microfoundations
of our cross-player restrictions on trembles, provided they satisfy Proposition 6 whenever s∗i % s∗j .
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opponents. This phenomenon of endogenous correlation through the optimal stopping
rule is the reason player compatibility is defined in terms of correlated profiles.
For Bayes-UCB, under the assumptions of Theorem 2, the agent may rank oppo-
nents’ mixed actions on each h ∈ Fi[si] from least favorable to most favorable. The
analogous opponent strategy profile is the behavior strategy where the q-th quantile
mixed action is played on each h, in terms of i’s current belief about opponents’ play.
Importantly, if i and j share the same beliefs about −ij’s play and rank −ij’s mixed
actions in the same way, then the “q-th quantile profile” is the same for both agents.
6 Concluding Discussion
PCE makes two key contributions. First, it generates new and sensible restrictions
on equilibrium play by imposing cross-player restrictions on the relative probabilities
that different players assign to certain strategies — namely, those strategy pairs si, sj
ranked by the compatibility relation si % sj. As we have shown through examples, this
distinguishes PCE from other refinement concepts, and allows us to make comparative
statics predictions in some games where other equilibrium refinements do not.
Second, PCE shows how the the device of restricted “trembles” can capture some
of the implications of non-equilibrium learning. As we saw, PCE’s cross-player restric-
tions arise endogenously in both the standard model of Bayesian agents maximizing
their expected discounted lifetime utility, and the computationally tractable heuris-
tics of Bayesian upper confidence bounds. We conjecture that the result that i is
more likely to experiment with si than j with sj when si % sj applies in other natural
models of learning or dynamic adjustment, such as those considered by Francetich
and Kreps (2018), and that it may be possible to provide foundations for PCE in
other and perhaps larger classes of games.
The strength of the PCE refinement depends on the completeness of the com-
patibility order %, since -PCE imposes restrictions on i and j’s play only when the
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relation si % sj holds. Our player compatibility definition supposes that player i
thinks all mixed strategies of other players are possible, as it considers the set of
all totally mixed correlated strategies σ−i ∈ ∆◦(S−i). If the players have some prior
knowledge about their opponents’ utility functions, player i might deduce a priori
that the other players will only play strategies in some subset A−i of ∆◦(S−i). As
we show in Fudenberg and He (2017), in signaling games imposing this kind of prior
knowledge leads to a more complete version of the compatibility order. It may simi-
larly lead to a more refined version of PCE.
PCE is defined for general strategic forms. We have only provided learning foun-
dations for player-compatible trembles in factorable games, but we view this as an
improvement over the more typical situation in which refinements have no learning
foundations at all.We
In more general extensive-form games two complications arise. First, player i may
have several actions that lead to the same information set of player j, which makes the
optimal learning strategy more complicated. Second, player i may get information
about how player j plays at some information sets thanks to an experiment by some
other player k, so that player i has an incentive to free ride. We plan to deal with
these complications in future work. Moreover, we conjecture that in games where
actions have a natural ordering, learning rules based on the idea that nearby strategies
induce similar responses can provide learning foundations for refinements in which
players tremble more onto nearby actions, as in Simon (1987). More speculatively,
the interpretation of trembles as arising from learning may provide learning-theoretic
foundations for equilibrium refinements that restrict beliefs at off-path information
sets in general extensive-form games, such as perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991; Watson, 2017), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) and
its extension to games with infinitely many actions (Simon and Stinchcombe, 1995;
Myerson and Reny, 2018).
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Appendix
7 Proofs of Results Stated in the Main Text
7.1 Proof of Proposition 3
We first state an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 3. If σ◦ is an -PCE and s∗i % s∗j , then
σ◦i (s∗i ) ≥ min
σ◦j (s∗j), 1− ∑
s
′
i 6=s∗i
(s′i|i)
 .
Proof. Suppose  is player-compatible and let -equilibrium σ◦ be given. For s∗i % s∗j ,
suppose σ◦j (s∗j) = (s∗j | j). Then σ◦i (s∗i ) ≥ (s∗i | i) ≥ (s∗j | j) = σ◦j (s∗j), where the
second inequality comes from  being player compatible. On the other hand, suppose
σ◦j (s∗j) > (s∗j | j). Since σ◦ is an -equilibrium, the fact that j puts more than the
minimum required weight on s∗j implies s∗j is at least a weak best response for j against
σ◦, with σ◦ totally mixed due to the trembles.The definition of s∗i % s∗j then implies
that s∗i must be a strict best response for i against σ◦ as well. In the -equilibrium,
i must assign as much weight to s∗i as possible, so that σ◦i (s∗i ) = 1 −
∑
s
′
i 6=s∗i (s
′
i|i).
Combining these two cases establishes the desired result.
Proposition 3: For any PCE σ∗, player k, and strategy s¯k such that σ∗k(s¯k) > 0,
there exists a sequence of totally mixed strategy profiles σ(t)−k → σ∗−k such that
(i) for every pair i, j 6= k with s∗i % s∗j ,
lim inf
t→∞
σ
(t)
i (s∗i )
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
≥ 1;
and (ii) s¯k is a best response for k against every σ(t)−k .
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Proof. By Lemma 3, for every (t)-PCE we get
σ
(t)
i (s∗i )
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
≥ min
σ(t)j (s∗j)
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
,
1−∑s′i 6=s∗i (t)(s′i|i)
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)

= min
1, 1−
∑
s
′
i 6=s∗i 
(t)(s′i|i)
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
 ≥ 1− ∑
s
′
i 6=s∗i
(t)(s′i|i).
This says
inf
t≥T
σ
(t)
i (s∗i )
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
≥ 1− sup
t≥T
∑
s
′
i 6=s∗i
(t)(s′i|i).
For any sequence of trembles such that (t) → 0,
lim
T→∞
sup
t≥T
∑
s
′
i 6=s∗i
(t)(s′i|i) = 0,
so
lim inf
t→∞
σ
(t)
i (s∗i )
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
= lim
T→∞
inft≥T σ
(t)
i (s∗i )
σ
(t)
j (s∗j)
 ≥ 1.
This shows that if we fix a PCE σ∗ and consider a sequence of player-compatible
trembles (t) and (t)-PCE σ(t) → σ∗, then each σ(t)−k satisfies lim inft→∞σ(t)i (s∗i )/σ(t)j (s∗j) ≥
1 whenever i, j 6= k and s∗i % s∗j . Furthermore, from σ∗k(s¯k) > 0 and σ(t)k → σ∗k, we
know there is some T1 ∈ N so that σ(t)k (s¯k) > σ∗k(s¯k)/2 for all t ≥ T1. We may also
find T2 ∈ N so that (t)(s¯k|k) < σ∗k(s¯k)/2 for all t ≥ T2, since (t) → 0. So when
t ≥ max(T1, T2), σ(t)k places strictly more than the required weight on s¯k, so s¯k is at
least a weak best response for k against σ(t)−k. Now the subsequence of opponent play
(σ(t)−k)t≥max(T1,T2) satisfies the requirement of this proposition.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1: PCE exists in every finite strategic-form game.
Proof. Consider a sequence of tremble profiles with the same lower bound on the
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probability of each strategy, that is (t)(si|i) = (t) for all i and si, and with (t)
decreasing monotonically to 0 in t. Each of these tremble profiles is player-compatible
(regardless of the compatibility structure %) and there is some finite T large enough
that t ≥ T implies an (t)-equilibrium exists, and some subsequence of these (t)-
equilibria converges since the space of strategy profiles is compact. By definition
these (t)-equilibria are also (t)-PCE, which establishes existence of PCE.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4: In a signaling game, every PCE σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium satisfying
the compatibility criterion, as defined in Fudenberg and He (2018).
Proof. Since every PCE is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and since this latter
solution concept refines Nash, σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
To show that it satisfies the compatibility criterion, we need to show that σ∗2 as-
signs probability 0 to plans in AS that do not best respond to beliefs in the set P (s, σ∗)
as defined in Fudenberg and He (2018). For any plan assigned positive probability
under σ∗2, by Proposition 3 we may find a sequence of totally mixed signal profiles σ
(t)
1
of the sender, so that whenever sθ % sθ′ we have lim inft→∞ σ
(t)
1 (s|θ)/σ(t)1 (s|θ′) ≥ 1.
Write q(t)(·|s) as the Bayesian posterior belief about sender’s type after signal s un-
der σ(t)1 , which is well defined because each σ
(t)
1 is totally mixed. Whenever sθ % sθ′ ,
this sequence of posterior beliefs satisfies lim inft→∞ q(t)(θ|s)/q(t)(θ′|s) ≥ λ(θ)/λ(θ′),
so if the receiver’s plan best responds to every element in the sequence, it also best
responds to an accumulation point (q∞(·|s))s∈S with q∞(θ|s)/q∞(θ′ |s) ≥ λ(θ)/λ(θ′)
whenever sθ % sθ′ . Since the player compatibility definition used in this paper is
slightly easier to satisfy than the type compatibility definition that the set P (s′ , σ∗)
is based on, the plan best responds to P (s′ , σ∗) after every signal s.
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7.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose there is some profile of moves by−i, (ah)h∈H−i ,
so that h∗ is off the path of play in (si, (ah)h∈H−i) = (si, ah∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗). Find
a different action of j on h∗, a′h∗ 6= ah∗ . Since h∗ is off the path of play, both
(si, ah∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗) and (si, a
′
h∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗) lead to the same payoff for i. But
by Condition (1) in the definition of factorability and the fact that h∗ ∈ Fi[si], we
will have found two −i action profiles s−i, s′−i in two different blocks of Πi[si] with
Ui(si, s−i) = Ui(si, s
′
−i). This contradicts Πi[si] being the coarsest partition of S−i
that makes Ui(si, ·) measurable.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First, there must be at least two different actions for j on h∗, else i’s payoff
would be trivially independent of h∗.
So, there exist actions ah∗ 6= a′h∗ on h∗ and a profile a−h∗ of actions elsewhere in
the game tree, so that Ui(ah∗ , a−h∗) 6= Ui(a′h∗ , a−h∗). Consider the strategy si for i
that matches a−h∗ in terms of play on i’s information sets, so we may equivalently
write
Ui(si, ah∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗) 6= Ui(si, a
′
h∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗),
where (ah)h∈H−i\h∗ are the components of a−h∗ corresponding to information sets of
−i. If h∗ /∈ Fi[si], then by Condition (1) of factorability, (ah∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗) and
(a′h∗ , (ah)h∈H−i\h∗) belong to the same block in Πi[si]. Yet, they give different payoffs
to i, which contradicts that i’s payoff after si must be measurable with respect to
Πi[si].
7.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We first show that i′s induced response against i.i.d. play drawn from σ−i is the same
as playing against a response path drawn from η at the start of i’s life. This η is the
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same for all agents and does not depend on their (possibly stochastic) learning rules.
Lemma 4. In a factorable game, for each σ ∈ ×k∆(Sk), there is a distribution η over
response paths, so that for any player i, any possibly random rule ri : Yi → ∆(Si),
and any strategy si ∈ Si, we have
φi(si; ri, σ−i) = (1− γ)EA∼η
[ ∞∑
t=1
γt−1 · (yti(A, ri) = si)
]
,
where yti(A, ri) refers to the t-th period history in yi(A, ri).
Proof. In fact, we will prove a stronger statement: we will show there is such a
distribution that induces the same distribution over period-t histories for every i,
every learning rule ri, and every t.
Think of each response path A as a two-dimensional array, A = (at,h)t∈N,h∈H. For
non-negative integers (Nh)h∈H, each profile of sequences of actions ((anh,h)
Nh
nh=1)h∈H
where anh,h ∈ Ah defines a “cylinder set” of response paths with the form:
{A : at,h = anh,h for each h ∈ H, 1 ≤ nh ≤ Nh}.
That is, the cylinder set consists of those response paths whose first Nh elements
for information set h match a given sequence, (anh,h)
Nh
nh=1. (If Nh = 0, then there
is no restriction on at,h for any t.) We specify the distribution η by specifying the
probability it assigns to these cylinder sets:
η
{
((anh,h)
Nh
nh=1)h∈H
}
=
∏
h∈H
Nh∏
nh=1
σ(s : s(h) = anh,h),
where we have abused notation to write ((anh,h)
Nh
nh=1)h∈H for the cylinder set satisfying
this profile of sequences, and we have used the convention that the empty product is
defined to be 1. Recall that a strategy profile s in the extensive-form game specifies
an action s(h) ∈ Ah for every information set h in the game tree. The probability
that η assigns to the cylinder set involves multiplying the probabilities that the given
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mixed strategy σ leads to such a pure-strategy profile s so that anh,h is to be played
at information set h, across all such anh,h restrictions defining the cylinder set.
We establish the claim by induction on t for period-t history. For t ≥ 0, let
Yi[t] ⊆ Yi be the set of possible period-t histories of i, that is Yi[t] := (Si × R)t. In
the base case of t = 1, we show playing against a response path drawn according to
η and playing against a pure strategy23 drawn from σ−i ∈ ×k 6=i∆(Sk) generate the
same period-1 history. Fixing a learning rule ri : Yi → ∆(Si) of i, the probability
of i having the period-1 history (s(1)i , (a
(1)
h )h∈Fi[s(1)i ]) ∈ Yi[1] in the random-matching
model is ri(∅)(s(1)i ) · σ(s : s(I) = a(1)h for all h ∈ Fi[s(1)i ]). That is, i’s rule must play
s
(1)
i in the first period of i’s life, which happens with probability ri(∅)(s(1)i ). Then,
i must encounter such a pure strategy that generates the required profile of moves
(a(1)h )h∈Fi[s(1)i ] on the s
(1)
i -relevant information sets, which has probability σ(s : s(h) =
a
(1)
h for all h ∈ Fi[s(1)i ]). The probability of this happening against a response path
drawn from η is
ri(∅)(s(1)i ) · η(A :a1,h = a(1)h for all h ∈ Fi[s(1)i ])
=ri(∅)(s(1)i ) ·
∏
h∈Fi[s(1)i ]
σ(s : s(h) = a(1)h )
=ri(∅)(s(1)i ) · σ(s : s(h) = a(1)h for all h ∈ Fi[s(1)i ]),
where the second line comes from the probability η assigns to cylinder sets, and the
third line comes from the fact that σ ∈ ×k∆(Sk) involves independent mixing of pure
strategies across different players.
We now proceed with the inductive step. By induction, suppose random matching
and the η-distributed response path induce the same distribution over the set of
period-T histories, Yi[T ], where T ≥ 1. Write this common distribution as φRMi,T =
23In the random matching model agents are facing a randomly drawn pure strategy profile each
period (and not a fixed behavior strategy): they are matched with random opponents, who each
play a pure strategy in the game as a function of their personal history. From Kuhn’s theorem, this
is equivalent to facing a fixed profile of behavior strategies.
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φηi,T = φi,T ∈ ∆(Yi[T ]). We prove that they also generate the same distribution over
length T + 1 histories.
Suppose random matching generates distribution φRMi,T+1 ∈ ∆(Yi[T + 1]) and the
η-distributed response path generates distribution φηi,T+1 ∈ ∆(Yi[T + 1]). Each length
T+1 history yi[T+1] ∈ Yi[T+1] may be written as (yi[T ], (s(T+1)i , (a(T+1)h )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ])),
where yi[T ] is a length-T history and (s(T+1)i , (a
(T+1)
h )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ]) is a one-period history
corresponding to what happens in period T + 1. Therefore, we may write for each
yi[T + 1],
φRMi,T+1(yi[T + 1]) = φRMi,T (yi[T ]) · φRMi,T+1|T ((s(T+1)i , (a(T+1)h )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ])|yi[T ]),
and
φηi,T+1(yi[T + 1]) = φ
η
i,T (yi[T ]) · φηi,T+1|T ((s(T+1)i , (a(T+1)h )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ])|yi[T ]),
where φRMi,T+1|T and φ
η
i,T+1|T are the conditional probabilities of the form “having history
(s(T+1)i , (a
(T+1)
h )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ]) in period T +1, conditional on having history yi[T ] ∈ Yi[T ]
in the first T periods.” If such conditional probabilities are always the same for the
random-matching model and the η-distributed response path model, then from the
hypothesis φRMi,T = φ
η
i,T , we can conclude φRMi,T+1 = φ
η
i,T+1.
By argument exactly analogous to the base case, we have for the random-matching
model
φRMi,T+1|T ((s
(T+1)
i , (a
(T+1)
h ))|yi[T ]) = ri(yi(T ))(s(T+1)i )·σ(s : s(h) = a(T+1)h for all h ∈ Fi[s(T+1)i ]),
since the matching is independent across periods.
But in the η-distributed response path model, since a single response path is
drawn once and fixed, one must compute the conditional probability that the drawn
A is such that the response (a(T+1)h )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ] will be seen in period T + 1, given the
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history yi[T ] (which is informative about which response path i is facing).
For each h ∈ H−i, let the non-negative integer Nh represent the number of times
i has observed play on the information set h in the history yi[T ]. For each h, let
(anh,h)
Nh
nh=1 represent the sequence of opponent actions observed on h in chronological
order. The history yi[T ] so far shows i is facing a response sequence in the cylinder
set consistent with ((anh,h)
Nh
nh=1)h∈H. If A is to respond to i’s next play of s
(T+1)
i
with a(T+1)h on the s
(T+1)
i -relevant information sets, then A must belong to a more
restrictive cylinder set, satisfying the restrictions:
((anh,h)
Nh
nh=1)h∈H\Fi[s(T+1)i ], ((anh,h)
Nh+1
nh=1 )h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ],
where for each h ∈ Fi[s(T+1)i ], aNh+1,h = a(T+1)h . The conditional probability is then
given by the ratio of η-probabilities of these two cylinder sets, which from the defini-
tion of η must be ∏
h∈Fi[s(T+1)i ]
σ(s : s(h) = a(T+1)h ). As before, the independence of σ
across players means this is equal to σ(s : s(h) = a(T+1)h for all h ∈ Fi[s(T+1)i ]).
Given this result, to prove that φi(s∗i ; ri, σ−i) ≥ φj(s∗j ; rj, σ−j), it suffices to show
that for every A, the period where s∗i is played for the k-th time in induced history
yi(A, ri) happens earlier than the period where s∗j is played for the k-th time in history
yj(A, rj).
Now we turn to the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ γ < 1 and the learning environment σ be fixed. Consider the product
distribution η on the space of response paths, (×h∈HAh)∞, whose marginal on each
copy of ×h∈HAh is the action distribution of σ.
By Lemma 4, denote the period where s∗i appears in yi(A, ri) for the k-th time as
T
(k)
i , the period where s∗j appears in yj(A, rj) for the k-th time as T
(k)
j . The quantities
T
(k)
i , T
(k)
j are defined to be ∞ if the corresponding strategies do not appear at least
k times in the infinite histories. Write #(s′i; k) ∈ N ∪ {∞} be the number of times
s
′
i ∈ Si is played in the history yi(A, ri) before T (k)i . Similarly, #(s′j; k) ∈ N ∪ {∞}
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denotes the number of times s′j ∈ Sj is played in the history yj(A, rj) before T (k)j .
Since ϕ establishes a bijection between Si and Sj, it suffices to show that for every
k = 1, 2, 3, ... either T (k)j =∞ or for all s′i 6= s∗i , #(s′i; k) ≤ #(s′j; k) where s′j = ϕ(s′i).
We show this by induction on k. First we establish the base case of k = 1.
Suppose T (1)j 6= ∞, and, by way of contradiction, suppose there is some s′i 6= s∗i
such that #(s′i, 1) > #(ϕ(s
′
i), 1). Find the subhistory yi of yi(A, ri). that leads to s
′
i
being played for the (#(ϕ(s′i), 1) + 1)-th time, and find the subhistory yj of yj(A, rj)
that leads to j playing s∗j for the first time (yj is well-defined because T
(1)
j 6= ∞).
Note that yi,s∗i ∼ yj,s∗j vacuously, since i has never played s∗i in yi and j has never
played s∗j in yj. Also, yi,s′i ∼ yj,s′j since i has played s
′
i for #(ϕ(s
′
i), 1) times and j
has played s′j for the same number of times, while the definition of response sequence
implies they would have seen the same history of play on the common information
sets of −ij, Fi[s′i] ∩ Fj[s′j]. This satisfies the definition of third-party equivalence of
histories.
Since rj(yj) = s∗j and rj is an index rule, s∗j must have weakly the highest index
at yj. Since ri is more compatible with s∗i than rj is with s∗j , s
′
i must not have the
weakly highest index at yi. And yet ri(yi) = s
′
i, contradiction.
Now suppose this statement holds for all k ≤ K for some K ≥ 1. We show it also
holds for k = K + 1. If T (K+1)j =∞ or T (K)j =∞, we are done. Otherwise, by way of
contradiction, suppose there is some s′i 6= s∗i so that #(s′i, K + 1) > #(ϕ(s′i), K + 1).
Find the subhistory yi of yi(A, ri). that leads to s
′
i being played for the (#(ϕ(s
′
i), K+
1) + 1)-th time. Since T (K)j 6= ∞, from the inductive hypothesis T (K)i 6= ∞ and
#(s′i, K) ≤ #(ϕ(s′i), K). That is, i must have played s′i no more than #(ϕ(s′i), K)
times before playing s∗i for the K-th time. Since #(ϕ(s
′
i), K + 1) + 1 > #(ϕ(s
′
i), K),
the subhistory yi must extend beyond period T (K)i , so it contains K instances of i
playing s∗i .
Next, find the subhistory yj of yj(A, rj) that leads to j playing s∗j for the (K+ 1)-
th time. (This is well-defined because T (K+1)j 6= ∞.) Note that yi,s∗i ∼ yj,s∗j , since i
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and j have played s∗i , s∗j for K times each, and they were facing the same response
paths. Also, yi,s′i ∼ yj,s′j since i has played s
′
i for #(ϕ(s
′
i), K + 1) times and j has
played s′j for the same number of times. Since rj(yj) = s∗j and rj is an index rule, s∗j
must have weakly the highest index at yj. Since ri is more compatible with s∗i than
rj is with s∗j , s
′
i must not have the weakly highest index at yi. And yet ri(yi) = s
′
i,
contradiction.
8 Compatibility for Index Rules
In this section, we show that under the conditions of Theorem 2, the Gittins index
and the UCB index satisfy the comparative compatibility condition for index rules.
Omitted proofs from this section can be found in the Online Appendix.
8.1 The Gittins Index
Let survival chance γ ∈ [0, 1) and patience δ ∈ [0, 1) be fixed. Let νsi ∈ ×h∈Fi[si]∆(∆(Ah))
be a belief over opponents’ mixed actions at the si-relevant information sets. The
Gittins index of si under belief νsi is given by the maximum value of the following
auxiliary optimization problem:
sup
τ≥1
Eνsi
{∑τ
t=1(δγ)t−1 · ui(si, (ah(t))h∈Fi[si])
}
Eνsi {
∑τ
t=1(δγ)t−1}
,
where the supremum is taken over all positive-valued stopping times τ ≥ 1. Here
(ah(t))h∈Fi[si] means the profile of actions that −i play on the si-relevant information
sets the t-th time that i uses si — by factorability, only these actions and not actions
elsewhere in the game tree determine i’s payoff from playing si. The distribution over
the infinite sequence of profiles (ah(t))∞t=1 is given by i’s belief νsi , that is, there is
some fixed mixed action in ×h∈Fi[si]∆(Ah) that generates profiles (ah(t)) i.i.d. across
periods t. The event {τ = T} for T ≥ 1 corresponds to using si for T times, observing
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the first T elements (ah(t))Tt=1, then stopping.
Write V (τ ; si, νsi) for the value of the above auxiliary problem under the (not
necessarily optimal) stopping time τ . The Gittins index of si is supτ>0 V (τ ; si, νsi).
We begin by linking V (τ ; si, τsi) to i’s stage-game payoff from playing si. From
belief νsi and stopping time τ , we will construct the correlated profile α(νsi , τ) ∈
∆◦(×h∈H[si]Ah), so that V (τ ; si, νsi) is equal to i’s expected payoff when playing si
while opponents play according to this correlated profile on the si-relevant information
sets.
Definition. A full-support belief νsi ∈ ×h∈Fi[si]∆(∆(Ah)) for player i together with a
(possibly random) stopping rule τ > 0 together induce a stochastic process (a˜(−i),t)t≥1
over the space ×h∈Fi[si]Ah∪{∅}, where a˜(−i),t ∈ ×h∈Fi[si]Ah represents the opponents’
actions observed in period t if τ ≥ t, and a˜(−i),t = ∅ if τ < t. We call a˜(−i),t player i’s
internal history at period t and write P(−i) for the distribution over internal histories
that the stochastic process induces.
Internal histories live in the same space as player i’s actual experience in the
learning problem, represented as a history in Yi. The process over internal histories
is i’s prediction about what would happen in the auxiliary problem (which is an
artificial device for computing the Gittins index) if he were to use τ.
Enumerate all possible profiles of moves at information sets Fi[si] as ×h∈Fi[si]Ah =
{a(1)(−i), ...,a(K)(−i)}, let pt,k := P(−i)[a˜(−i),t = a(k)(−i)] for 1 ≤ k ≤ K be the probability
under νsiof seeing the profile of actions a
(k)
(−i) in period t of the stochastic process over
internal histories, (a˜(−i),t)t≥0, and let pt,0 := P(−i)[a˜(−i),t = ∅] be the probability of
having stopped before period t.
Definition. The synthetic correlated profile at information sets in Fi[si] is the el-
ement of ∆◦(×h∈Fi[si]Ah) (i.e. a correlated random action) that assigns probability∑∞
t=1 β
t−1pt,k∑∞
t=1 β
t−1(1−pt,0) to the profile of actions a
(k)
(−i). Denote this profile by α(νsi , τ).
Note that the synthetic correlated profile depends on the belief νsi stopping rule τ,
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and effective discount factor β. Since the belief νsi has full support, there is always a
positive probability assigned to observing every possible profile of actions on Fi[si] in
the first period, so the synthetic correlated profile is totally mixed. The significance
of the synthetic correlated profile is that it gives an alternative expression for the
value of the auxiliary problem under stopping rule τ .
Lemma 5.
V (τ ; si, νsi) = Ui(si, α(νsi , τ))
The proof is the same as in Fudenberg and He (2018) and is omitted.24
Consider now the situation where i and j share the same beliefs about play of −ij
on the common information sets Fi[si]∩Fj[sj] ⊆ H−ij. For any pure-strategy stopping
time τj of j, we define a random stopping rule of i, the mimicking stopping time for
τj. Lemma 6 will establish that the mimicking stopping time generates a synthetic
correlated profile that matches the corresponding profile of τj on Fi[si] ∩ Fj[sj].
The key issue in this construction is that τj maps j’s internal histories to stopping
decisions, which does not live in the same space as i’s internal histories. In particular,
τj makes use of i’s play to decide whether to stop. To mimic such a rule, i makes
use of external histories, which include both the common component of i’s internal
history on Fi[si] ∩ Fj[sj], as well as simulated histories on Fj[sj]\(Fi[si] ∩ Fj[sj]).
For Γ isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(si) = sj, we may write Fi[si] =
FC∪F j with FC ⊆ H−ij and F j ⊆ Hj. Similarly, we may write Fj[sj] = FC∪F i with
F i ⊆ Hi. (So, FC is the common information sets that are payoff-relevant for both si
and sj.) Whenever j plays sj, he observes some (a(C),a(i)) ∈ (×h∈FCAh)×(×h∈F iAh),
where a(C) is a profile of actions at information sets in FC and a(i) is a profile of actions
at information sets in F i. So, a pure-strategy stopping rule in the auxiliary problem
defining j’s Gittins index for sj is a function τj : ∪t≥1[(×h∈FCAh) × (×h∈F iAh)]t →
24Notice that even though i starts with the belief that opponents randomize independently at
different information sets, and also holds an independent prior belief, V (τ ; si, νsi) may not be the
the payoff of playing si against a independent randomizations by the opponent because of the
endogenous correlation that we discussed in the text.
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{0, 1} that maps finite histories of observations to stopping decisions, where “0” means
continue and “1” means stop.
Definition. Player i’s mimicking stopping rule for τj draws αi ∈ ×h∈F i∆(Ah) from
j’s belief νsj on F i, and then draws (a(i),`)`≥1 by independently generating a(i),` from
αi each period. Conditional on (a(i),`), i stops according to the rule (τi|(a(i),`))((a(C),`,a(j),`)t`=1) :=
τj((a(C),`,a(i),`)t`=1).25
That is, the mimicking stopping rule involves ex-ante randomization across pure-
strategy stopping rules τi|(a(i),`)∞`=1. First, i draws a behavior strategy on the infor-
mation set F i according to j’s belief about i’s play. Then, i simulates an infinite
sequence (a(i),`)∞`=1 of i’s play using this drawn behavior strategy and follows the
pure-strategy stopping rule τi|(a(i),`)∞`=1.
As in the definition of internal histories, the mimicking strategy and i’s belief νsi
generates a stochastic process (a˜(j),t, a˜(C),t)t≥1 of internal histories for i (representing
actions on Fi[si] that i anticipates seeing when he plays si). It also induces a stochastic
process (e˜(i),t, e˜(C),t)t≥1 of “external histories” defined in the following way:
Definition. The stochastic process of external histories (e˜(i),t, e˜(C),t)t≥1 is defined
from the process of internal histories (a˜(j),t, a˜(C),t)t≥1 that τi generates and given by:
(i) if τi < t, then (e˜(i),t, e˜(C),t) = ∅; (ii) otherwise, e˜(C),t = a˜(C),t, and e˜(i),t is the t-th
element of the infinite sequence (a(i),`)∞`=1 that i simulated before the first period of
the auxiliary problem.
Write Pe for the distribution over the sequence of of external histories generated
by i’s mimicking stopping time for τj, which is a function of τj, νsj , and νsi .
To understand the distinction between internal and external histories, note that
the probability of i’s first-period internal history satisfying (a˜(j),1, a˜(C),1) = (a¯(j), a¯(C))
for some fixed values (a¯(j), a¯(C)) ∈ ×h∈Fi[si]Ah is given by the probability that a mixed
25Here (a(−j),`)t`=1 = (a(C),`,a(i),`))t`=1. Note this is a valid (stochastic) stopping time, as the
event {τi ≤ T} is independent of any aI(t) for t > T.
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play α−i on Fi[si], drawn according to i’s belief νsi , would generate the profile of ac-
tions (a¯(j), a¯(C)). On the other hand, the probability of i’s first-period external history
satisfying (e˜(i),1, e˜(C),1) = (a¯(i), a¯(C)) for some fixed values (a¯(i), a¯(C)) ∈ ×h∈Fj [sj ]Ah
also depends on j’s belief νsj , for this belief determines the distribution over (a(i),`)∞`=1
drawn before the start of the auxiliary problem.
When using the mimicking stopping time for τj in the auxiliary problem, i expects
to see the same distribution of −ij’s play before stopping as j does when using τj,
on the information sets that are both si-relevant and sj-relevant. This is formalized
in the next lemma.
Lemma 6. For Γ isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(si) = sj, suppose i
holds belief νsi over play in Fi[si] and j holds belief νsj over play in Fj[sj], such that
νsi |Fi[si]∩Fj [sj ] = νsj |Fi[si]∩Fj [sj ], that is the two sets of beliefs match when marginalized
to the common information sets in H−ij. Let τi be i’s mimicking stopping time for τj.
Then, the synthetic correlated profile α(νsj , τj) marginalized to the information sets
of −ij is the same as α(νsi , τi) marginalized to the same information sets.
Proposition 7. Suppose Γ isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(s∗i ) = s∗j ,
ϕ(s′i) = s
′
j, where s∗i 6= s′i and s∗i % s∗j . Suppose i holds belief νsi ∈ ×h∈Fi[si]∆(∆(Ah))
about opponents’ play after each si and j holds belief νsj ∈ ×h∈Fj [sj ]∆(∆(Ah)) about
opponents’ play after each sj, such that νs∗i |Fi[s∗i ]∩Fj [s∗j ] = νs∗j |Fi[s∗i ]∩Fj [s∗j ] and νs′i |Fi[s′i]∩Fj [s′j ] =
νs′j
|Fi[s′i]∩Fj [s′j ]. If s
∗
j has the weakly highest Gittins index for j under effective discount
factor 0 ≤ δγ < 1, then s′i does not have the weakly highest Gittins index for i under
the same effective discount factor.
Proof. We begin by defining a profile of totally mixed correlated actions at informa-
tion sets ∪sj∈SjFj[sj] ⊆ H−j, namely a collection of totally mixed correlated profiles
(αFj [sj ])sj∈Sj where αFj [sj ] ∈ ∆◦(×h∈Fj [sj ]Ah). For each sj 6= s′j the profile αFj [sj ] is the
synthetic correlated profile α(νsj , τ ∗sj), where τ
∗
sj
is an optimal pure-strategy stopping
time in j’s auxiliary stopping problem involving sj. For sj = s
′
j, the correlated profile
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αFj [s′j ]
is instead the synthetic correlated profile associated with the mimicking stop-
ping rule for τ ∗
s
′
i
, i.e. agent i’s pure-strategy optimal stopping time in i’s auxiliary
problem for s′i.
Next, define a profile of totally mixed correlated actions at information sets
∪si∈SiFi[si] ⊆ H−i for i’s opponents. For each si /∈ {s∗i , s′i}, just use the marginal
distribution of αFj [ϕ(si)] constructed before on Fi[si] ∩ H−ij, then arbitrarily specify
play at j’s information sets contained in Fi[si], if any. For s
′
i, the correlated profile is
α(νs′i , τ
∗
s
′
i
), i.e. the synthetic move associated with i’s optimal stopping rule for s′i. Fi-
nally, for s∗i , the correlated profile αFi[s∗i ] is the synthetic correlated profile associated
with the mimicking stopping rule for τ ∗s∗
j
.
From Lemma 6, these two profiles of correlated actions agree when marginalized
to information sets of −ij. Therefore, they can be completed into totally mixed
correlated strategies, σ−i and σ−j respectively, such that σ−i|S−ij = σ−j|S−ij . For each
sj 6= s′j, the Gittins index of sj for j is Uj(sj, σ−j).Also, since αFj [s′j ] is the mixed profile
associated with the suboptimal mimicking stopping time, Uj(s
′
j, σ−j) is no larger than
the Gittins index of s′j for j. By the hypothesis that s∗j has the weakly highest Gittins
index for j,Uj(s∗j , σ−j) ≥ maxsj 6=s∗j Uj(sj, σ−j). By the definition of s∗i % s∗j we must
also have Ui(s∗i , σ−i) > maxsi 6=s∗i Ui(si, σ−i), so in particular Ui(s
∗
i , σ−i) > Ui(s
′
iσ−i).
But Ui(s∗i , σ−i) is no larger than the Gittins index of s∗i , for αFi[s∗i ] is the synthetic
strategy associated with a suboptimal mimicking stopping time. As Ui(s
′
i, σ−i) is
equal to the Gittins index of s′i, this shows s
′
i cannot have even weakly the highest
Gittins index at history yi, for s∗i already has a strictly higher Gittins index than s
′
i
does.
The following corollary of Proposition 7, combined with Proposition 6, establishes
the first statement of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. When s∗i % s∗j , i and j have the same patience δ, survival chance γ,
and equivalent independent regular priors, OPTi is more compatible with s∗i OPTj is
with s∗j .
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Proof. Equivalent regular priors require that priors are independent and that i and j
share the same prior beliefs over play on F ∗ := Fi[s∗i ]∩Fj[s∗j ] and over play on F ′ :=
Fi[s
′
i]∩Fj[s′j]. Thus after histories yi, yj such that yi,s∗i ∼ yj,s∗j and yi,s′i ∼ yj,s′j νs∗i |F ∗ =
νs∗j |F ∗ and νs′i |F ′ = νs′j |F ′ , so the hypotheses of Proposition 7 are satisfied.
8.2 Bayes-UCB
We start with a lemma that shows the Bayes-UCB index for a strategy si is equal to
i’s payoff from playing si against a certain profile of mixed actions on Fi[si], where
this profile depends on i’s belief about actions on Fi[si], the quantile q, and how usi,h
ranks mixed actions in ∆(Ah) for each h ∈ Fi[si].
Lemma 7. Let nsi be the number of times i has played si in history yi and let
qsi = q(nsi) ∈ (0, 1). Then the Bayes-UCB index for si and given quantile-choice
function q after history yi is equal to Ui(si, (α¯h)h∈Fi[si]) for some profile of mixed
actions where α¯h ∈ ∆◦(Ah) for each h. Furthermore, α¯h only depends on qsi, gi(·|yi,h)
i’s posterior belief about play on h, and how usi,h ranks mixed strategies in ∆(Ah).
Proof. For each h ∈ Fi[si], the random variable u˜si,h(yi,h) only depends on yi,h through
the posterior gi(·|yi,h). Furthermore, Q(u˜si,h(yi,h); qsi) is strictly between the highest
and lowest possible values of usi,h(·), each of which can be attained by some pure
action on Ah, so there is a totally mixed α¯h ∈ ∆◦(Ah) so that Q(u˜si,h(yi,h); qsi) =
usi,h(α¯h). Moreover, if usi,h and u
′
si,h
rank mixed strategies on ∆(Ah) in the same
way, there are a ∈ R and b > 0 so that u′si,h = a + busi,h. Then Q(u˜
′
si,h
(yi,h); qsi) =
a+ bQ(u˜si,h(yi,h); qsi), so α¯h still works for u
′
si,h
.
The second statement of Theorem 2 follows as a corollary.
Corollary 2. If s∗i % s∗j , and the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are satisfied, then UCBi
is more compatible with s∗i than UCBj is with s∗j .
Proof. When i and j have matching beliefs, by Lemma 7 we may calculate their
Bayes-UCB indices for different strategies as their myopic expected payoff of using
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these strategies against some common opponents’ play, as in the similar argument
for the Gittins index in Lemma 7. Applying the definition of compatibility, we can
deduce that when s∗i % s∗j and ϕ(s∗i ) = s∗j , if s∗j has the highest Bayes-UCB index for
j then s∗i must have the highest Bayes-UCB index for i.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6: For Γ isomorphically factorable for i and j with ϕ(si) = sj, suppose i
holds belief νsi over play in Fi[si] and j holds belief νsj over play in Fj[sj], such that
νsi |Fi[si]∩Fj [sj ] = νsj |Fi[si]∩Fj [sj ], that is the two sets of beliefs match when marginalized
to the common information sets in H−ij. Let τi be i’s mimicking stopping time for τj.
Then, the synthetic correlated profile α(νsj , τj) marginalized to the information sets
of −ij is the same as α(νsi , τi) marginalized to the same information sets.
Proof. Let (a˜(i),t, a˜(C),t)t≥1 and (e˜(i),t, e˜(C),t)t≥1 be the stochastic processes of internal
and external histories for τi, with distributions P−i and Pe. Enumerate possible
profiles of actions on FC as×h∈FCAh = {a(1)(C), ...,a(KC)(C) }, possible profiles of actions on
F j as ×h∈F jAh = {a(1)(j), ...,a(Kj)(j) }, and possible profiles of actions on F i as ×h∈F iAh =
{a(1)(i) , ...,a(Ki)(i) }.
Write pt,(kj ,kC) := P−i[(a˜(i),t, a˜(C),t) = (a
(kj)
(j) ,a
(kC)
(C) )] for kj ∈ {1, ..., Kj} and kC ∈
{1, ..., KC}. Also write qt,(ki,kC) := Pe[(e˜(i),t, e˜(C),t) = (a(ki)(i) ,a(kC)(C) )] for ki ∈ {1, ..., Ki}
and kC ∈ {1, ..., KC}. Let pt,(0,0) = qt,(0,0) := P−i[τi < t] = Pe[τi < t] be the probability
of having stopped before period t.
The distribution of external histories that i expects to observe before stopping un-
der belief νsiwhen using the mimicking stopping rule τi is the same as the distribution
of internal histories that j expects to observe when using stopping rule τj under belief
νsj , because i simulates the data-generating process on F i by drawing a mixed action
αi according to j’s belief νsj |F i and νsi |FC = νsj |FC . Thus for every ki ∈ {1, ..., Ki}
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and every kC ∈ {1, ..., KC},
∑∞
t=1(δγ)t−1qt,(ki,kC)∑∞
t=1(δγ)t−1(1− qt,(0,0))
= α(νsj , τj)(a
(ki)
(i) ,a
(kC)
(C) ).
For a fixed k¯C ∈ {1, ..., KC}, summing across ki gives
∑∞
t=1(δγ)t−1
∑Ki
ki=1 qt,(ki,k¯C)∑∞
t=1(δγ)t−1(1− qt,(0,0))
= α(νsj , τj)(a
(k¯C)
(C) ).
By definition, the processes (a˜(i),t, a˜(C),t)t≥0 and (e˜(i),t, e˜(C),t)t≥0 have the same marginal
distribution on the second dimension:
Ki∑
ki=1
qt,(ki,k¯C) = P−i[a˜(C),t = a
(k¯C)
(C) ] =
Kj∑
kj=1
pt,(kj ,k¯C).
Making this substitution and using the fact that pt,(0,0) = qt,(0,0),
∑∞
t=1(δγ)t−1
∑Kj
kj=1 pt,(kj ,k¯C)∑∞
t=1(δγ)t−1(1− pt,(0,0))
= α(νsj , τj)(a
(k¯C)
(C) ).
But by the definition of synthetic correlated profile, the LHS is∑Kjkj=1 α(νsi , τi)(a(kj)(j) ,a(k¯C)(C) ) =
α(νsi , τi)(a
(k¯C)
(C) ).
Since the choice of a(k¯C)(C) ∈ ×I∈FCAI was arbitrary, we have shown that the syn-
thetic profile α(νsj , τj) of the original stopping rule τj and the one associated with
the mimicking strategy of i, α(νsi , τi), coincide on FC .
8.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2: The Bayes-UCB rule ri,UCB and rj,UCB satisfy the hypotheses of Propo-
sition 6 when s∗i % s∗j , provided the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are satisfied.
Proof. Consider histories yi, yj with yi,s∗i ∼ yj,s∗j and yi,s′i ∼ yj,s′j . By Lemma 7,
there exist α¯−ih ∈ ∆◦(Ah) for every h ∈ ∪si∈SiFi[si] and α¯−jh ∈ ∆◦(Ah) for every h ∈
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∪si∈SiFj[sj] so that ιi,si(yi) = Ui(si, (α−ih )h∈Fi[si]) and ιj,sj(yj) = Uj(sj, (α−jh )h∈Fj [sj ])
for all si, sj, where ιi,si(yi) is the Bayes-UCB index for si after history yi and ιj,sj(yj)
is the Bayes-UCB index for sj after history yj.
Because yi,s∗i ∼ yj,s∗j and yi,s′i ∼ yj,s′j , yi contains the same number of s
∗
i exper-
iments as yj contains s∗j , and yi contains the same number of s
′
i experiments as yj
contains s′j. Also by third-party equivalence and the fact that i and j start with the
same beliefs on common relevant information sets, they have the same posterior be-
liefs gi(·|yi,I), gj(·|yj,I) for any h ∈ Fi[s∗i ] ∩ Fj[s∗j ] and h ∈ Fi[s′i] ∩ Fj[s′j]. Finally, the
hypotheses of Theorem 2 say that on any h ∈ Fi[s∗i ] ∩ Fj[s∗j ], us∗i ,h and us∗j ,h have the
same ranking of mixed actions, while on any h ∈ Fi[s′i] ∩ Fj[s′j], us′i,h and us′j ,h have
the same ranking of mixed actions. So, by Lemma 7, we may take α¯−ih = α¯
−j
h for all
h ∈ Fi[s∗i ] ∩ Fj[s∗j ] and h ∈ Fi[s′i] ∩ Fj[s′j].
Find some σ−j = (σ−ij, σi) ∈ ×k 6=j∆◦(Sk) so that σ−j generates the random
actions (α¯−jh ) on every h ∈ ∪sj∈SjFj[sj]. Then we have ιj,sj(yj) = Uj(sj, σ−j) for every
sj ∈ Sj. The fact that s∗j has weakly the highest index means s∗j is weakly optimal
against σ−j. Now take σ−i = (σ−ij, σj) where σj ∈ ∆◦(Sj) is such that it generates
the random actions (α¯−ih ) on Fi[s∗i ] ∩Hj and Fi[s′i] ∩Hj. But since α¯−ih = α¯−jh for all
h ∈ Fi[s∗i ] ∩ Fj[s∗j ] and h ∈ Fi[s′i] ∩ Fj[s′j], σ−i generates the random actions (α¯−ih ) on
all of Fi[s∗i ] and Fi[s
′
i], meaning ιi,s∗i (yi) = Ui(s
∗
i , σ−i) and ιi,s′i(yi) = Ui(s
′
i, σ−i). The
definition of compatibility implies Ui(s∗i , σ−i) > Ui(s
′
i, σ−i), so ιi,s∗i (yi) > ιi,s′i(yi). This
shows s′i does not have weakly the highest Bayes-UCB index, since s∗i has a strictly
higher one.
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Online Appendix
9 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Suppose s∗i % s∗j % s∗k where s∗i , s∗j , s∗k are strategies of i, j, k. Then
s∗i % s∗k.
Proof. Suppose s∗k is weakly optimal for k against some totally mixed correlated
profile σ(k). We show that s∗i is strictly optimal for i against any totally mixed and
correlated σ(i) with the property that marg−ik(σ(k)) = marg−ik(σ(i)).
To do this, we first modify σ(i) into a new totally profile by copying how the action
of i correlates with the actions of −(ik) in σ(k). To do this, for each s−ik ∈ S−ik and
si ∈ Si, σ(k)(si, s−ik) > 0 since marg−k(σ(k)) ∈ ∆◦(S−k). So write p(si | s−ik) :=
σ(k)(si,s−ik)∑
s
′
i
∈Si
σ(k)(s′i,s−ik)
> 0 as the conditional probability that i plays si given −ik play
s−ik, in the profile σ(k). Now construct the profile ˆˆσ ∈ ∆◦(S), where
ˆˆσ(si, s−ik, sk) := p(si | s−ik) · σ(i)(s−ik, sk).
Profile ˆˆσ has the property that marg−jk(ˆˆσ) = marg−jk(σ(k)). To see this, note first
that because ˆˆσ and σ(k) agree on the −(ijk) marginal marg−ik(σ(k)) = marg−ik(σ(i)).
Also, by construction, the conditional distribution of i’s action given profile of (−ijk)’s
actions is the same.
From the hypothesis that s∗j % s∗k, we get j finds s∗j strictly optimal against ˆˆσ.
But at the same time, marg−i(ˆˆσ) = marg−i(σ(i)) by construction, so this implies
also marg−ij(ˆˆσ) = marg−ij(σ(i)). From s∗i % s∗j , and the conclusion that j finds s∗j
strictly optimal against ˆˆσ just obtained, we get i finds s∗i strictly optimal against σ(i)
as desired.
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9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: If s∗i % s∗j , then eithers∗j 6% s∗i , or both s∗j and s∗i are weakly dominated
strategies.
For σ−i ∈ ∆(S−i) and si ∈ Si, write Ui(si, σ−i) to mean ∑s−i∈S−i Ui(si, s−i) ·
σ−i(s−i), and note that s∗i % s∗j if and only if for every totally mixed, correlated
strategy σ−j ∈ ∆◦(S−j) such that
Uj(s∗j , σ−j) ≥ max
s
′
j∈Sj\{s∗j}
Uj(s
′
j, σ−j),
we have for every σ−i ∈ ∆◦(S−i) satisfying marg−ij(σ−i) = marg−ij(σ−j),
Ui(s∗i , σ−i) > max
s
′
i∈Si\{s∗i }
Ui(s
′
i, σ−i).
Proof. Assume s∗i % s∗j and recall the maintained assumption that the game has no
strictly dominated strategy. We show that these assumptions imply either s∗j 6% s∗i ,
or both s∗j and s∗i are weakly dominated strategies.
Partition the set ∆◦(S−j) into three subsets, Π+ ∪Π0 ∪Π−, with Π+consisting of
representingσ−j ∈ ∆◦(S−j) that make s∗j strictly better than the best alternative pure
strategy, Π0 the elements of ∆◦(S−j) that make s∗j indifferent to the best alternative,
and Π−the elements that make s∗jstrictly worse. (These sets are well defined because
|Sj| ≥ 2, so j has at least one alternative pure strategy to s∗j .) If Π0 is non-empty,
then there is some σ−j ∈ Π0 such that Uj(s∗j , σ−j) = maxs′j∈Sj\{s∗j} Uj(s
′
j, σ−j). Because
s∗i % s∗j , Ui(s∗i , σˆ−i) > maxs′i∈Si\{s∗i } Ui(s
′
i, σˆ−i) for every σˆ−i ∈ ∆◦(S−i) such that
marg−ij(σ−j) = marg−ij(σ−i), so we do not have s∗j % s∗i .
Also, if both Π+ and Π− are non-empty, then Π0 is non-empty. This is because
both σ−j 7→ uj(s∗j , σ−j) and σ−j 7→ maxs′j∈Sj\{s∗j} uj(s
′
j, σ−j) are continuous functions.
If uj(s∗j , σ−j)−maxs′j∈Sj\{s∗j} uj(s
′
j, σ−j) > 0 and also uj(s∗j , σ
′
−j)−maxs′j∈Sj\{s∗j} uj(s
′
j, σ
′
−j) <
0, then some mixture between σ−j and σ
′
−j must belong to Π0.
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So we have shown that if either Π0 is non-empty or both Π+ and Π− are non-empty,
then s∗j 6% s∗i .
If only Π+ is non-empty, then s∗j is strictly dominant for j. Together with s∗i % s∗j ,
this would imply that s∗i is strictly dominant for i, which would make any other
strategy of i strictly dominated, contradiction.
Finally suppose that only Π− is non-empty, so that for every σ−j ∈ ∆◦(S−j) there
exists a strictly better pure response than s∗j against σ−j, then there exists a mixed
strategy σj for j that strictly dominates s∗j against all correlated play in ∆◦(S−j).
This shows s∗j is strictly dominated for j provided −j play a totally mixed profile —
in particular, s∗j is weakly dominated for j. Suppose there is a σ−i ∈ ∆◦(S−i) against
which s∗i is a weak best response. Then, the fact that s∗j is not a strict best response
against any σ−j ∈ ∆◦(S−j) means s∗j 6% s∗i . On the other hand, suppose s∗i is not a
weak best response against any σ−i ∈ ∆◦(S−i). Then s∗i is weakly dominated, as is
s∗j .
10 Refinements in the Link-Formation Game
Each of the following refinements selects the same subset of pure Nash equilibria when
applied to the anti-monotonic and co-monotonic versions of the link-formation game:
extended proper equilibrium, proper equilibrium, trembling-hand perfect equilibrium,
p-dominance, Pareto efficiency, and strategic stability. Pairwise stability does not
apply to the link-formation game. Finally, the link-formation game is not a potential
game.
Step 1. Extended proper equilibrium, proper equilibrium, and trembling-
hand perfect equilibrium allow the “no links” equilibrium in both versions
of the game. For (qi) anti-monotonic with (ci), for each  > 0 let N1 and S1 play
Active with probability 2, N2 and S2 play Active with probability . For small
enough , the expected payoff of Active for player i is approximately (10− ci) since
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terms with higher order  are negligible. It is clear that this payoff is negative for
small  for every player i, and that under the utility re-scalings βN1 = βS1 = 10,
βN2 = βS2 = 1, the loss to playing Active smaller for N2 and S2 than for N1 and
S1. So this strategy profile is a (β, )-extended proper equilibrium. Taking → 0, we
arrive at the equilibrium where each player chooses Inactive with probability 1.
Proof. For the version with (qi) co-monotonic with (ci), consider the same strategies
without re-scalings, i.e. β = 1. Then already the loss to playing Active smaller for
N2 and S2 than for N1 and S1, making the strategy profile a (1, )-extended proper
equilibrium.
These arguments show that the “no links” equilibrium is an extended proper
equilibrium in both versions of the game. Every extended proper equilibrium is also
proper and trembling-hand perfect, which completes the step.
Step 2. p−dominance eliminates the “no links” equilibrium in both ver-
sions of the game. Regardless of whether (qi) are co-monotonic or anti-monotonic
with (ci), under the belief that all other players choose Active with probability p for
p ∈ (0, 1), the expected payoff of playing Active (due to additivity across links) is
(1− p) · 0 + p · (10 + 30− 2ci) > 0 for any ci ∈ {14, 19}.
Step 3. Pareto eliminates the “no links” equilibrium in both versions of
the game. It is immediate that the no-links equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated
by the all-links equilibrium outcome under both parameter specifications, so Pareto
efficiency would rule it out whether (ci) is anti-monotonic or co-monotonic with (qi).
Step 4. Strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) eliminates the “no
links” equilibrium in both versions of the game.. First suppose the (ci) are anti-
monotonic with (qi). Let η = 1/100 and let 
′
> 0 be given. Define N1(Active) =
S1(Active) = 2
′
, N2(Active) = S2(Active) = 
′ and i(Inactive) = 
′ for all
players i. When each i is constrained to play si with probability at least i(si), the
only Nash equilibrium is for each player to choose Active with probability 1 − ′ .
(To see this, consider N2’s play in any such equilibrium σ. If N2 weakly prefers Ac-
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tive, then N1 must strictly prefer it, so σN1(Active) = 1 − ′ ≥ σN2(Active). On
the other hand, if N2 strictly prefers Inactive, then σN2(Active) = 
′
< 2′ ≤
σN1(Active). In either case, σN1(Active) ≥ σN2(Active).) When both North play-
ers choose Active with probability 1 − ′ , each South player has Active as their
strict best response, so σS1(Active) = σS2(Active) = 1 − ′ . Against such a pro-
file of South players, each North player has Active as their strict best response, so
σN1(Active) = σN2(Active) = 1− ′ .
Now suppose the (ci) are co-monotonic with (qi). Again let η = 1/100 and let

′
> 0 be given. Define N1(Active) = S1(Active) = 
′
, N2(Active) = 
′
/1000,
S2(Active) = 
′ and i(Inactive) = 
′ for all players i. Suppose by way of contradic-
tion there is a Nash equilibrium σ of the constrained game which is η-close to the Inac-
tive equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, N2 must strictly prefer Inactive, otherwise
N1 strictly prefersActive so σ could not be η-close to the Inactive equilibrium. Simi-
lar argument shows that S2 must strictly prefer Inactive. This shows N2 and S2 must
play Active with the minimum possible probability, that is σN2(Active) = 
′
/1000
and σS2(Active) = 
′ . This implies that, even if σN1(Active) were at its minimum
possible level of ′ , S1 would still strictly prefer playing Inactive because S1 is 1000
times as likely to link with the low-quality opponent as the high-quality opponent.
This shows σS1(Active) = 
′ . But when σS1(Active) = σS2(Active) = 
′ , N1
strictly prefers playing Active, so σN1(Active) = 1 − ′ . This contradicts σ being
η-close to the no-links equilibrium.
Step 5. Pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) does not apply to
this game. This is because each player chooses between either linking with every
player on the opposite side who playsActive, or linking with no one. A player cannot
selectively cut off one of her links while preserving the other.
Step 6. The game does not have an ordinal potential, so refinements
of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) do not apply. To see that
this is not a potential game, consider the anti-monotonic parametrization. Suppose
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a potential P of the form P (aN1, aN2, aS1, aS2) exists, where ai = 1 corresponds to i
choosing Active, ai = 0 corresponds to i choosing Inactive. We must have
P (0, 0, 0, 0) = P (1, 0, 0, 0) = P (0, 0, 0, 1),
since a unilateral deviation by one player from the Inactive equilibrium does not
change any player’s payoffs. But notice that uN1(1, 0, 0, 1)−uN1(0, 0, 0, 1) = 10−14 =
−4, while uS2(1, 0, 0, 1) − uS2(1, 0, 0, 0) = 30 − 19 = 11. If the game has an ordinal
potential, then both of these expressions must have the same sign as P (1, 0, 0, 1) −
P (1, 0, 0, 0) = P (1, 0, 0, 1)−P (0, 0, 0, 1), which is not true. A similar argument shows
the co-monotonic parametrization does not have a potential either.
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